

Analysis of the Indian Defence Approach in the last 70 years

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ABBREVIATIONS

CENTO	Central Treaty Organization
CPEC	China-Pakistan Economic Corridor
DPC	Defence Policy Committee
IAEC	Indian Atomic Energy Commission
IAF	Indian Air Force
INA	Indian National Army
INC	Indian National Congress
IPKF	Indian Peacekeeping Force
J&K	Jammu and Kashmir
LIC	Low-Intensity Conflict
LoC	Line of Control
LTIPP	Long Term Integrated Perspective Plan
LTTE	Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
LWE	Left-Wing Extremism
MoD	Ministry of Defence
NAM	Non-Aligned Movement
NEFA	North-East Frontier Agency
NPT	Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
NSA	National Security Advisor
NWFP	North West Frontier Province
PAF	Pakistan Air Force
PLA	People's Liberation Army
PLOTE	People's Liberation Organization of Tamil Eelam
PM	Prime Minister
POK	Pakistan Occupied Kashmir
POW	Prisoners of War
PRC	People's Republic of China
RAW	Research and Analysis Wing
R&D	Research and Development

SEATO	South-East Asian Treaty Organization
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UPA	United Progressive Alliance
USA	United States of America
USD	United States Dollar
UNLF	United National Liberation Front
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

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Introduction

The trajectory of events from 1939 to 1945 changed the very paradigm of world politics and paved the way for some crucial moments in global history. One striking example of this was the end of imperialism in the global political arena, with India leading the way in 1947. While it is true that the British Empire realised the inevitability of their eventual loss of control over their colonies in Asia, World War II did act as a catalyst in the process, especially in the Indian context. Post-war British Empire got engaged in rebuilding itself and its shattered economy and was thus in no position to allocate sufficient funds to stabilise their control over the colonies. Adding to this, Bengal underwent the catastrophic famine in 1943 whose grave nature still failed to gather the required attention of the British Administration, which in turn was more concerned with the resources they were able to extract for their wartime needs.

The British managed to raise the world's largest volunteer force in the War with 2.5 million soldiers belonging to India alone. "India became a vast garrison and supply-ground for the war against the Japanese in South-East Asia." (Y. Khan 2017). Battles of Monte Cassino, Tobruk, Kohima and Imphal became the golden feathers in the hat of the success of the Indian soldiers and their ferocity and dedication became the yardstick for several warring regiments involved in the global conflict.

India at this point of time was at the precipice of a massive change in its internal politics with a majority of its leaders driven into exile. The INA or more patriotically known as the "Azad Hind Fauj" was formed in 1942 under the leadership of Captain Mohan Singh and encompassed of those Indian soldiers who became POW's under the Japanese after their invasion of Malaya (present-day Malaysia) in 1941 (Roysam 2017). The famous Subhash Chandra Bose then took the lead on this in 1943, colouring the spirit of the army with myriad shades of invigoration, determination and dedication. It did lose in its battle against the British Forces in Imphal and Kohima in due course of time; however, it gave a valorous answer to the British. The uproar that it created after the battles confirmed the fear of the much awaited impending doom of the British Raj in India. At the same time, it was also responsible for the emergence of a newly grounded faith and confidence that

the Indian military had in their military capabilities. (Harris 2014)

The three main aspects of smooth and efficient administration of a country consist of Foreign Affairs, Communications and Defence. India fought in the Second World War under the British leadership as an experienced force, with a rich fighting experience in the past including the Third Anglo-Afghan War (1919), Waziristan Campaigns (1919-1920 and 1936-1939) and the First World War. As a result of this, India was left with a well-trained, experienced and professional defence force after their independence in 1947. This, in turn, enabled the leaders of this infant nation to focus on the development of the other two afore-mentioned aspects. The Defence Force was hence used to strengthen India's identity as a sovereign nation on the global platform as well as a tool for unifying the divided factions of the country into a unified whole.

The aim of this paper is to trace the approach Indian governance has had over the course of the last seven decades towards the nation's defence and how it has evolved based on the experiences it has gained on the battlefield and the diplomatic ambit along with the nature and level of threats that the country has endured.

Overview of the External Threats Faced by India

One of the quintessential factors that determine the velocity of a country's economic development is the kind and degree of external threats faced by it. The emergence of any grave threat on the external front creates an "economic stress" (Campose 2018) in the country since resources that were initially meant to be utilised for human development purposes are diverted towards defence purposes.

External threats faced by India today have their foundation base in India's geographic location, political scenario in 1947 as well as the history the country shares with its neighbours. In order to get a clearer understanding of the external threats India has been dealing with from the last 70 years, it is imperative that one understands its individual relations with two of its most strategic neighbours—China and Pakistan. At the same time, it is equally crucial to note that the development in India's external threats from China and Pakistan has had a direct impact in India's Defence Approach over the last seven decades. The fluctuating relations India shares with both the countries, keeping in context progressive trade pacts on one end and military stand-offs on the other, makes it extremely difficult for scholars and analysts alike to describe the Sino-Indian and Indo-Pak relations in a concrete manner.

India and China today stand as an example of sustaining the most unexpected foreign relations. Keeping in mind the parity in their histories and socio-economic challenges, anyone would have expected them to be

the best of friends. However, that being said, “The relationship between China and India is marred by the legacy of a failed promise of post-colonial cooperation.” (Gwozdz 2016) “More dangerous than Pakistan, more enduring than Kashmir, China is India’s curse.” (Mead 2010)

Both the countries had a strong sense of cultural harmony over the centuries with the Silk Route acting as the main tool to achieve this. The imperialist mindset of the British undermined the strength of the Sino-Indian relations, which crystallised further in an overt manner after India’s independence in 1947. Keeping its ideological differences aside, India was the second Non-Communist Country to recognise PRC in 1949.

The year 1954 witnessed the inception and emergence of the famous slogan *Hindi-Chini Bhai Bhai* after the signing of the famous Panchsheel Agreement, also known as the India-China Agreement on Peaceful Coexistence.¹ Adding to this, India was also one such country that tried to break the phase of isolation that the Western Nations had imposed on China during the 1950s and 1960s. All in all, the development of friendly relations between the two countries was moving in a fairly positive and steady direction.

The situation took an ugly turn first in 1957 when the Indian Army discovered a road under construction by the Chinese which connected Xinjiang and Western Tibet and passed through the Aksai Chin region in eastern Ladakh that India perceived to be a part of its own territory. China as a reaction questioned the legality of the McMahon Line and thereby claimed Arunachal Pradesh to be a part of China’s territory. This was followed by the Tibetan Uprising in 1959, especially after India under the governance of the Nehru Government granted political asylum to Tibet’s Spiritual Buddhist Leader, the Dalai Lama. The annexation of Tibet by China in 1950 converted the unsettled border issue between British India and Tibet into a full-blown border conflict between the two countries. Unaware of the fact that the Indian military was fairly under-prepared, it received orders from the political leadership in 1962 to follow a “Forward Policy”² which became the final trigger for the infamous 1962 Sino-India War, which in turn dealt a ghastly blow to the friendly relations between the two nations. The war had catastrophic impact not only on the Indian economy, but also on India’s military reputation which gave Pakistan the idea to make best use of this weak point in the Indian economy, thereby leading to the Indo-Pak War of 1965. Furthermore, it also opened the gates to the border conflict that ensues between the two countries even today in the Northeast, with the constant fear of war looming over both the countries.

The period of 1970-1990 was filled with strategic fluctuations in India with respect to China. By 1970, India had fought two severe resource draining

wars with both China and Pakistan and its relations with the then Soviet Union was also slowly watering down, while its relations with the United States were fairly uncertain. After Indira Gandhi's unfortunate demise Rajiv Gandhi took a stronger conciliatory step in 1988 and extended the olive branch by visiting Beijing. By 1989 after the collapse of the Berlin Wall, the disintegration of the Soviet Empire was more or less seen as inevitable. This meant that India could not rely on it anymore for intervening against China. In other words, India was on its own.

Owing to the way the Indian economy eventually picked up even after the tight situation it faced in the global political arena and the way it thus developed today makes it "arguably a more substantial challenge" (Beeson and Li 2014) to China. The relations shared between the two countries highlight the foreign relations problem that the Chinese Policymakers deal with not only with respect to India but China's other bordering neighbours as well. Yet the reasons why India has to take China seriously are something that is quite easy to understand. This makes up the basis for which India and China can today be regarded as a "classic example security dilemma in which strategic uncertainty and concern about the behaviour of the other states paradoxically leads to greater insecurity." (Booth and Wheeler 2008)

India and Pakistan have endured strained relations ever since the two came into existence. While some argue that it was and will be their conflict of opinion over Kashmir that is the focal point of the deteriorating relations, some on the other hand argue that the very logic behind the partition can also be a reason behind this, with an "armed truce between theocratic Muslim Pakistan and secular but Hindu dominated India" (Singh 2006) being the only viable solution.

The problem began in 1947 itself when tensions and confusion over accession of Kashmir arose. During that time, Kashmir was under the Hindu ruler Raja Hari Singh and yet was home to around 75% Muslim population. Hari Singh refused to accede to either Pakistan or India and decided to rule over Kashmir as an independent kingdom. Pakistan's consequential attempt thereafter to seize the Muslim majority areas by force resulted in Hari Singh acceding to India due to Kashmir's dire need for military support.³ The issue was eventually taken to the UNSC, who was "strongly of the opinion that the early restoration of peace and order in Jammu and Kashmir is essential" (S/RES/47(1948) 1948). In this respect via their Resolution 47, the UNSC called for a plebiscite as a means of settling the matter. Pakistan was expected to withdraw all their troops from the area of Jammu and Kashmir while India was to keep only the amount of troops required to maintain civil order. Pakistan chose to not comply with their terms of the mandate and from

there on till the present moment, Kashmir has been a burning issue between the two nations.

The situation that ensued enabled Pakistan to start selling themselves as an area of “geostrategic advantage,” which initially trapped the United States due to their quest of bulwarking the growth of the Soviets in Afghanistan during the Cold War. This, in simpler words, meant that Pakistan now had a constant flow of military and economic aid from the United States, which it used to arm itself against India. For this very purpose, Pakistan also became a member of the anti-communist alliance SEATO in 1954 which later on became the CENTO in 1958. (M. Khan 1964)

Pakistan used these resources in two major instances against India, the first being in 1965, three years after India’s humiliating and resource draining defeat against China in 1962; and secondly in 1971⁴ when India helped in the liberation of East Pakistan, and the subsequent formation of Bangladesh. In both these instances, the Indian military put up a steady front which resulted in the defeat of Pakistan. However, the flow of aid from the United States still continued, initially in view of their Cold War efforts against the Soviets till about the 1980s, and then eventually in 2001 as a part of their efforts to defeat the Taliban in Afghanistan. The United States stopped providing aid to Pakistan once they realised how this decision of theirs had backfired on them. Pakistan used the funds to either arm itself against India or support the Haqqani faction of the Taliban that took the lead in the Taliban’s attacks against the United States.

In the recent sphere of things, it is China that has taken over the USA’s position to be Pakistan’s leading economic benefactor. Their relationship which was concretised in 2015 via the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor⁵ (CPEC) is the perfect elucidation of the common saying: “An Enemy’s Enemy is a Friend.” This \$46 billion project connects Xinjiang in China and Gwadar in Pakistan. In their attempt to do so, they are passing through the Gilgit-Balistan area of the POK that India claims to be a part of its own territory. This is one reason why India’s current Prime Minister Narendra Modi told China that the establishment of this corridor was “unacceptable.” (Shah 2017) While Pakistan Authorities might claim that this economic corridor would be economically beneficial for all the regions involved and not just Pakistan and China, the military implications of this corridor are far more perverse. The conflict India faces from both the countries has also cascaded in worsening the internal security problems India is currently dealing with. This includes terrorism in J&K in the North and Naxalism in the Centre and East of India. Usage of internal security threats to secure vested interests by opponents is a very common occurrence, thereby making it all the more

important for India to have their strategies to tackle it in place. India's hostile relations with both the countries is a well-known fact and thus this corridor is a direct indication for India to be much more vigilant about its neighbours than it already was.

Defence Approach of India Chapter I: 1947-1962

The Military Strategy adopted by India after its independence in 1947 is a direct elucidation of the legacy left by the Military Strategy adopted by the British during their control of the country. Analysis of the military strategy makes it an important component in getting a thorough understanding of India's Defence Approach during the years 1947-1962. India was a nascent country in the global political arena which was distinctively marred by implicit power hierarchy (due to Cold-War politics) that played a vital role in firmly placing India's national interests in the international context. Having a well-shaped military strategy was the first step India had to take to achieve this. Hence in order to understand how India's military strategy took shape during the years 1947-1962, one needs to first understand how British Indian military strategy worked.

The most distinctive feature of the British Indian Military Strategy was the "Ring Fence" (Kavic 1967) Approach. This comprised two rings—Inner Ring and Outer Ring. The former comprised the Himalayan kingdoms of Sikkim, Bhutan, Nepal, NEFA in Assam and NWFP; while the latter comprised the Persian Gulf Sheikhdome, Persia and Afghanistan. The British managed the Inner Ring via sheer direct control and the Outer Ring via various diplomatic measures. The two factors that contributed towards the stability of British military control in India was their strong naval force that protected the coasts of India along with having a firm grip over the Indian Ocean Region, and their manipulative techniques to maintain the "Balance of Power."

Till the time India came under the formal British Crown in 1858, Russia and the tribal regions of Afghanistan and Assam were seen as quiet areas that meant no harm. However in 1858 itself, with India coming under the British Crown, Russia occupied the Khantes region, which in turn started ringing alarm bells in the British Administration. Various British Administrators such as Lord Curzon and Lord Kitchener then took steps to deal with this issue.

The major turning point in British Military Strategy came due to and during World War I, which was responsible for the emergence of the Royal Indian Air Force. The post-war period witnessed the realisation by British Policymakers to restrict the Indian Army's functions to maintaining internal security only and changes were accordingly incorporated. The famous "nationalist non-cooperation movement increased the Hindu-Muslim

animosity and renewed trouble in the NWFP created an additional burden for the Indian defence plans” (Sen 2017), which was once again resolved to some extent based on the report given by the committee formed under Lord Chatfield in 1939.

All in all, the basic premise of the British Indian Military Strategy was the interdependence between the two countries based on military resources (Kavic 1967), wherein the British provided protection to India from external and internal aggression in return for India’s support to protect British interests outside India. This principle was not only inherent in World War I but World War II as well. The dearth of financial resources in India made the Indian Military during the World War II heavily dependent on the British for basic supplies.⁵ The lessons learnt from the war helped in bringing a paradigm shift in the thought process of both the British and Indian leaders. It was now clear that the British could not manage keeping their own interests and India’s interests safe at the same time considering the emergence of Japan as their biggest Asiatic enemy.⁶

The INC, in the course of working towards India’s freedom, never gave much concrete thought to independent India’s military and defence needs. Much emphasis was put on political freedom of India and how that could be gained. It was only when Jawaharlal Nehru gained prominence in the party that the idea of future defence needs was addressed by him. He argued that, “None of the major world powers would be prepared to permit the invasion of the subcontinent on account of its geostrategic, political and economic potential and importance once the British had left” (Smith 1994). However, Nehru still lacked the appropriate platform⁷ to build on this, something he was able to gain only after India’s independence in 1947.

India’s Military Strategy from 1947-1962 was thus the product of two major influential factors: one being Nehru’s political outlook, philosophy and perception of India’s military needs and second being India’s nationalist opinion in the pre-independence days. India gained independence with a defence policy that had no substance in it and the primary goal of bringing in an era of peace, which in turn was viable for India’s much needed economic and industrial development. The task of thus transforming India into a viable nation state was on Nehru’s shoulders and one way of doing so was developing a military strategy that best suited the nation’s needs.

In this respect, Nehru had to deal with three major bulwarks in his way. Firstly, it was the legacy that was left behind by Subhash Chandra Bose and his Azad Hind Fauj. Bose strongly believed in the creation of armed forces that were truly representative of the people. This was the very opposite of what Gandhi stood for. Hence, even though there was a convergence in the

thought process of Bose and Gandhi back in the pre-independence days, Nehru had to come up with a military strategy that was fairly novel in its own way other than being inherent of INA's legacy. Secondly, the problem faced by Nehru was the partition. While the INC was all in favour of direct action as a means to put forth their point, ethnic unity was something that gained widespread mistrust against them post 1947 due to the partition. While due credit needs to be given to the Indian Army for handling the partition fairly well and help in decimating the idea of not linking national security and nation building (Banerjee 2017), the partition also led to the loss of Karachi—which was “strategically important for naval docking purposes—and many of (its) natural features could have inhibited territorial invasion.” (Smith 1994) Lastly, the third problem faced by Nehru was to tackle the possibility of superpower influence, keeping in mind India's experience in both the World Wars and how it got involved in a war without its consent.

Nehru's fundamental objective in the first decade of Independence was to initiate the process of development in the country and bring a major chunk of the Indian population above the poverty line. Nehru thus “intervened extensively in military affairs. He sharply limited military spending⁸ based on his belief in the necessity of using those funds for developmental tasks combined with his assessment that Pakistan was the principal threat to India, and one that could be managed with modest defence funding.” (Clary 2017) In the ensuing environment, India moved forward with a lack of serious introspection towards their defence strategy. It was only after the war India fought with Pakistan during 1947-1948, in view of the latter occupying a portion of Kashmir, that the need to have a policy of forward defence with regard to Pakistan was duly realised by the Government. “In the aftermath of the war, India's strategic thinking rested on four pillars: to maintain conventional military superiority over Pakistan; to maintain friendly relations with China; to stay free of Cold War politics and entanglements; and to promote solidarity and cooperation among developing countries.” (Ganguly 2015)

Apart from the situation in Kashmir, India also dealt with the accession of Hyderabad in 1948 and Liberation of Goa in 1961. These were comparatively less reactive in terms of the military strategy that was employed by India. The major turning point for independent Indian Military Strategy started showing its mark from the 1950s onwards. The 1950s witnessed India's quintessential role in the founding of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) that ensured India's protection from the surging superpower influence. Many scholars in this regard feel that NAM was in many ways a diplomatic milestone for India who succeeded to establish a stronger footing in the global political arena, as

against Pakistan who started to build military alliances out of their sheer fear of India and the conflict over Kashmir.

It was also in 1950 when Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel penned down his famous letter⁹ to Nehru, warning him about China and the possibility of conflicts in the Aksai Chin region, ironically a year later after India became the second Non-Communist country to recognise People's Republic of China. The letter however was disregarded. The dispute that eventually came about in the Aksai Chin region during the late 1950s led to one of the most devastating wars for India in 1962 against China. "The 1962 directive to an ill-prepared and ill-equipped Army to throw the Chinese out was ill-advised, besides air power was not used to support ground operations. The operation stank of political unilateralism, lack of strategic thinking, planning and vision." (Katoch 2012)

Defence Approach of India Chapter II: 1963-1971

"The 1962 Sino-Indian War was both a surprise and a disaster for India and the ramifications were numerous and far-reaching." (Smith 1994) It was now clear that India's security arrangements based on the outlook that Nehru had on India's governance, were futile. A unanimous approach was then adopted that worked towards allocating more resources to the development of the country's military capabilities. This was seen in three major ways. Firstly, the Defence Budget in 1963 was allocated 4% of India's GNP, as against 2.7% that had been allocated in 1962. (SIPRI 2017) India's Military Strategy during this time frame can be described "Offensive Defensive Posture," as against the "Defensive Posture" description given to the strategy during 1947-1962.

Secondly, "The Sino-Indian conflict in 1962 aroused a new defence consciousness in the country. After taking care of immediate post-war requirements, systematic defence planning started in 1964." (Malik and Kanwal 2005) This took the form of the Five Year Defence Plans, the first of this being launched in April 1964. Threat perception from the aspect of the Army, Air Force and Navy was duly assessed, after which plans were drawn up that mainly focused on expansion and modernisation of the Services.¹⁰

Lastly, a Planning Cell was also established in 1965 that worked with the Ministry of Defence (MoD) and helped the latter deal with the wider aspects of defence planning. It was the Planning Cell that "undertook the task of formulating the defence five year plan". (Behera 2010) The Planning Cell intended to maintain regular contact between the Planning Commission and other ministries along with facilitating medium and long-term defence planning.

The period of 1963-1971 also witnessed a steady development in the relations between India and the Soviet Union. During the 1960s the split between USSR and PRC¹¹ became a reality and the relations between India

and the USSR improved. This relationship helped India gain massively in the field of technology and its transfer, apart from the stronger footing in global politics, even though they followed the policy of Non-Alignment. The Soviets accepted this and chose to help bolster the Indian Economy by helping build industries at low cost with minimum Soviet personnel being stationed in India during the process.¹² It was due to the Soviet support that India's Military Strategy during this time period became "offensive defensive" in nature.

The foundation of the prospering relations between the two countries was laid during the late 1940s itself when the USSR supported India during deliberations at the UN regarding the Kashmir Issue. India in return supported the USSR's resolution for truce in Korea. (Zafar 1984) Thereafter, the relations between the two countries grew in the form of trade pacts and diplomatic meetings which eventually led to arms trade.

During the Sino-Indian Conflict, the arms trade between the two countries was at its nascent stage; however, it did help India to a huge extent. This can be seen in two ways, the first being that the arms sales took place against deferred rupee payments, which was a major concession for India who severely lacked foreign exchange reserves; and the second being the fact that Soviet arms sales were not accompanied by any sort of demands or expectations from India to change their foreign policy or adhere to Soviet foreign policy for that matter, thereby keeping the Indian autonomy intact.

In 1964, the USA refused to sell their F-104 Fighter Jets to India for political reasons¹³ which once again opened the doors for a big arms deal between India and the USSR. This arms deal came to India's rescue in the fall of 1965 when, after a failed attempt at starting insurrection in Kashmir, Pakistan used ambiguity over the borders of Rann of Kutch as the focal point of their second war against India. While Kashmir was the primary motivator for Pakistan, India's humiliating defeat in 1962 and crippling defence was also a reason that convinced Pakistan that the time was ripe to attack India to maximise their gains.

India at this point aptly realised the futility of its efforts to limit its countermeasures to Pakistan's attacks, which started at the international border of Chamb. Thus, despite the fact that India had made it clear several times that an attack on Kashmir would be taken as an attack on India, India chose to counter Pakistan from Punjab. This in turn meant that India intended to carry out the war by getting inside Pakistan from Punjab and capture as much territory. This was the only way by which India could bulwark Pakistan's intentions in Kashmir. The end result of this was seen in the considerable amount of damage that India inflicted upon Pakistan. However in the process of doing so, it suffered significant casualties on its own end as well. This

can thus be seen as a major factor that made both the countries agree to a ceasefire called upon by the UN. (Rao 2015)

If looked at from a theoretical perspective, then it is a difficult task to ascertain as to who won the war. Defence expenditure was at a peak as was the devastation of their respective economies. There was a common realisation by both India and Pakistan to now focus mainly on rebuilding the economy and handle the internal situations. However, it was a major victory for India since it passed its first test on secularism with flying colours. (Chandra, Mukherjee and Mukherjee 2008) This was seen in the united stance that the soldiers took at the border, regardless of their religious backgrounds. Furthermore, it also massively boosted the morale of the Indian Soldiers, which was completely shattered after the 1962 war. Adding to this, “in the full-scale conventional war lasting 22 days, India captured some 1,920 sq km of Pakistani territory ... (as against) the loss of almost 550 sq km of its own territory.” (Raghavan 2015) The war also showed the smooth level of coordination between the services, as recounted by Gautam Banerjee, “The Indo-Pakistan War of 1965 forged a new paradigm of inter-service jointness. And that sunshine lasted, occasional hiccups notwithstanding, till the late 1980s.” (Banerjee 2017)

The war of 1965 came in with close proximity to the Sino-Indian Conflict of 1962 and Nehru’s death in 1964. This, in turn, resulted in many questioning the viability of India’s approach to Non-Alignment as a means of securing national security. Non-Alignment may have given India a stronger footing to India beyond Asia; however, it failed to give a concrete solution to the problems faced by India on the home front. In a span of three years, India managed to get involved in border conflicts with both Pakistan and China, who were also edging close to each other diplomatically. Furthermore, India had no assurance from any superpower to exert their influence and prevent an attack from either of the countries.

The era of Lal Bahadur Shastri and Indira Gandhi can be aptly described as one that “pivoted India’s Military Policy away from the Nehru approach to Pakistan and China.” (Kapur 2015) One classic example of this can be seen in the way Shastri decided to move Indian troops inside Pakistan so as to relieve pressure in Kashmir. This decision was a “sharp departure from the Nehru-Mountbatten Approach.” (Kapur 2015)

After Shastri’s death in 1966, Indira Gandhi had to deal with massive consolidation of the Indian polity, keeping in mind the domestic tensions and crisis in foreign exchange caused by the wars. In 1969, she split from the Congress, thereby consolidating her political position. Thus, while India was witnessing some massive political happenings within its borders, military activity was fairly low-key.

The post-1965 war period saw a massive dip in the economic development of the country due to the drought of 1965-1967, decline in foreign aid and contradictions in the Indian Economy. The direct implication of this was a shift in the focus once again from Defence Planning to Economic Management. By 1969, the deficiencies in the First Five Year Defence Plan started showing¹⁴ which the MoD made an effort to compensate for in the Second Five Year Plan that was constituted on a “roll-on” basis, wherein one year was added to the defence plan in order to provide the defence services with a revised and updated defence plan. (Malik and Kanwal 2005) Another aspect that impacted defence policy was the dip in the relations between the USSR and India.¹⁵ Thus, an amalgamation of economic, political problems and lack of foreign aid made it tough for India to aptly focus on the development of the defence sector of the country.

However, at the same time, one major lesson that the Indian Governance took from the war of 1965 was the inadequacies in Indian Intelligence, how misleading and inaccurate it was. (Ganapathy 2014) PM Indira Gandhi felt that the need for a more structured intelligence wing was imperative and thus the Research and Analysis Wing, more commonly known as RAW, was established in September 1968 with R. N. Kao as its first director.

The end of the 1960s also saw the emergence of the Constitutional Crisis in East Pakistan, which was a result of the clash between Awami League’s Sheikh Mujibir’s quest for equal treatment for the citizens of East Pakistan and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s over-ambitious desire to be the undisputed leader of Pakistan as a whole. In the process, Pakistan’s Military Leadership fell into the clutches of Bhutto’s propaganda “and started an unprecedented campaign of atrocities, suppression of Bengalis, oppression of intellectuals and minorities with such ruthlessness and cruelty as had not been seen since Hitler’s days.” (Kaul 1979) This resulted in massive influx of refugees into India in West Bengal, at a time when India itself was dealing with a highly vulnerable economy, characterised by high rates of inflation, severely low levels of food stocks and foreign exchange balances.

Indian Armed Forces and Intelligence Services paid close attention (Kak 2012) to the happenings in Pakistan and the resultant refugee problem that was created for India, for Pakistan had pushed around 9 million refugees into India in this process. (Pandit 2017) Indira Gandhi tried her level best to mobilise international sympathy towards the cause of the people in East Pakistan and strived for the early return of refugees if the conditions in East Pakistan were suitable enough, as could be seen during her Six Nation Tour. At this point, India could either support Pakistan in crushing the rebellion in East Pakistan or support the liberation and creation of Bangladesh.

Military preparations and diplomatic efforts to avert the situation were undertaken simultaneously. In this respect, India signed the Treaty of Peace and Friendship with the USSR in August 1971, thereby assured itself of their military support in case Pakistan decided to attack India. It was only when India ran out of all possible diplomatic options that it finally accepted the possibility of a war, primarily on grounds of protecting national security interests. When Gen. Yahya Khan (President of Pakistan during that time) increased Pakistan's war preparations, Indira Gandhi took the daunting decision of militarily supporting the liberation of East Pakistan, keeping in mind the harsh implications it could have on the domestic and foreign front.

The War of 1971 showcased the use of a balanced strategy, encompassing an Offensive Approach in the East and Defensive Approach in the West. The IAF in this respect played a quintessential role and aimed to eliminate the PAF at the earliest in the east, at the same time giving maximum support to the Army in the form of offensive support, transport and helicopter support and providing maritime support to the Indian Navy. Similarly on the West, India had three main priorities—defending the home bases; providing tactical support to the Army and Navy by maintaining a favourable air situation and lastly to counter air operations against enemy airbases and radar stations, and attacks on strategic targets which had a vital role in sustaining the economy and the war potential of the enemy. (Tiwary 2016)

The whole concept of carrying out counter-attacks in order to relieve defensive positions that was initiated by the 1965 War could be seen gaining considerable importance in 1971 as well. All in all, India believed that it could carry out the “lighting campaign” the way it did in 1965 in the west during the war and this proved to be a viable decision for India. (Clary 2017) In other words, Indian military strategy inculcated the idea of “obstacle based defence” during the 1971 war, which involved “penetration and manoeuvre warfare to destroy enemy forces and capture territories.” (Banerjee 2017) At this juncture, it is also important to note that the strong politico-military equation between Indira Gandhi and Chief of Army Staff Gen. Sam Manekshaw was also responsible for India's success in 1971.

Defence Approach of India Chapter III: 1972-1980

Military Strategy from 1971 onwards thrived on the concept of Deterrence, which “refers to policies designed to discourage the adversary from taking direct or proxy military action, by raising the cost so that it outweighs the gains that he may wish to attain.” Defence or dissuasion policies which “are designed to reduce the capability of the adversary to cause damage—and own costs and risks—in the event deterrence fails.” It was only in this phase

of the Indian Military Strategy that the policymakers realised how Deterrence and Defence are interrelated to one another. (Malik and Kanwal 2005) Thus, military strategic activity was fairly low-key with India adopting Deterrence policies with respect to Pakistan and Dissuasion policies towards China.

The War of 1971 proved the unquestionable nature of the superiority Indian Military held over their Pakistani counterparts. However, at the same time, this was not the case for India against China and their PLA. China tested their first nuclear bomb in 1964 and their name under the “Nuclear Weapon States” (Kimball 2018) category of the NPT gave their nuclear arsenal legitimate backing. In 1972 itself, China’s defence expenditure was US\$ 31.1 billion while India’s was US\$ 2.93 billion. (C. N. Smith 1975) India’s military focus vis-à-vis China thus involved two things: “the development of India’s nuclear weapons programme so that India could deter the Chinese from making any attempt at nuclear blackmail” and “development of India’s conventional military capability, particularly the army’s high-altitude mountain warfare capability and the air force’s air support capability, so that Indian forces could thwart attempts by the PLA to advance into Indian territory across the contested Sino-Indian border.” (Ganguly 2015)

The credit for laying the etymological base of nuclear research can be duly given to the Indian physicist Homi J. Bhabha, especially after he founded the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC) in 1954. During the same year, Indo-Canadian Nuclear Collaboration also took place that massively bolstered nuclear research.¹⁶ During the late 1960s, India’s Nuclear Programme suffered a major setback, due to Dr. Bhabha’s untimely death in 1966, lack of political decision-making and Nehru’s death in 1964. India thus needed a strong political leadership who could take brave decisions as far as India’s Nuclear Programme was concerned. This void was filled by Indira Gandhi, which was first seen in 1968 when India strongly criticised the NPT on discriminatory grounds and thus chose to steer clear from it.

In 1970, Dr. Vikram Sarabhai took the lead in the IAEC and proposed his “ten-year” profile of development in atomic research which was accepted by the government. This helped the field of atomic research regain its stronger footing. Sarabhai was succeeded by Homi N. Sethna in 1972, who then spearheaded the IAEC till 1974. By 1973, India successfully completed all the necessary preparations for conducting a nuclear weapons test. The political approval for this was given in 1974, after much debate on the viability of the test on an international level for India, and thus took place Operation Smiling Buddha, also known as Pokhran I, India’s first peaceful and successful nuclear weapons test, under the political leadership of Indira Gandhi and scientific leadership of Sethna.

The success of the test gave a clear indication of India's capability to design and build nuclear weapons. The perceived connection between superpower status and nuclear arsenal along with the prestige that technological prowess carried with it (Sahni 1996) made Operation Smiling Buddha a symbol of national achievement. Indira Gandhi's unassailable position enabled her to carry her father Nehru's legacy to keep all the details of her operation highly secret (Karnad 2002), which can be attributed as one of the reasons why the test was conducted smoothly and successfully. While the test was declared time and again by India to be for peaceful purposes, it did catch the major international actors by surprise. Pakistan strongly condemned it and vowed to never give in to any form of nuclear domination. Similarly, both the USA and Canada reacted negatively since the test was possible based on the nuclear agreements India had with both, which coincided with ongoing negotiations on the NPT.

India's Defence Approach from 1972 to 1980 can be succinctly summarised as the phase where all the services went through modernisation and each appropriately benefited from it. "The army invested in 'new tanks armoured fighting vehicles, modern artillery, ground-attack missiles, air defence systems and the country's first attack helicopters.' Likewise, with Soviet support, the navy started to slowly build up its capacity to patrol the Arabian Sea and the Bay of Bengal and to protect India's long coastline. The air force initiated a major upgrade of its Soviet built inventory of fighter jets, the MiG-21 and the Sukhoi Su-7, which had proved effective during the 1971 Bangladesh war." (Ganguly 2015)

The year 1975 saw the catastrophic and infamous Emergency at its peak wherein political instability was heightened along with social mobilisation, factors that made military intervention inevitable. Yet, due to insulation of military from politics, the Indian Military exhibited restraint towards the country's political situation. (A. Shah 2017) Morarji Desai replaced Indira Gandhi as the Prime Minister in 1977 and set off on an ambitious path to get rid of all inherent aspects of her outlook on Indian governance. This steadfast approach of his has both pros and cons. While he may have repealed the outrageous 42nd and 44th Amendments of the Constitution, he also viewed RAW as nothing more than a regular police force.

In the same year, RAW agents in Pakistan managed to gain intricate details about Pakistan's Nuclear Programme and their efforts to make the "Islamic Bomb." However, due to his lack of faith in RAW leading to the unfortunate resignation of R. N. Kao, the fate of the agents in Pakistan was sealed. He informed Pakistan about India's knowledge of their nuclear programme and Pakistan in turn ensured that it took down each of RAW's agents in Pakistan. "Morarji Desai blew India's most critical covert operation, fully compromised

our secret services, and helped Pakistan make the 'Islamic bomb.'" (Nawal 2016) This was one massive strategic defeat for India, based completely on the whims of a leader blinded by his feelings of animosity.

The Janata Government had no clear vision on how to take India's Military Strategy forward, which in turn bulwarked the progress in the country's defence approach. The mistakes of the past were repeated and it looked as though India had reached square one. The Parliament Debates never focused on how to establish synchrony between Foreign Policy and Defence. Import of arms took place from varied sources in order to reduce dependency on the USSR, without taking into consideration the operational costs that would be incurred in the process. The overall situation was thus chaotic. The only silver lining in this entire process was the fact that both Morarji Desai and his successor Charan Singh pushed for modernisation of the military, something that was supported by their much hated predecessor, Indira Gandhi.

Defence Approach of India Chapter IV: 1980-Present

India's Defence Approach from the 1980s onwards can succinctly be explained as one that was highlighted by several strategic developments so as to deal with the tense external environment India was enduring. Indira Gandhi once again took the lead in 1980 when she was re-elected as the country's prime minister. She pushed forward the idea of modernisation of the military which helped in bolstering national security. The flip side here was that she as a leader was often tempted to use the military as a means of intervening in the internal politics of the country. This was seen in 1984 during the Operation Blue Star in Amritsar which led to her unfortunate assassination the same year.

Indira Gandhi was succeeded by her son Rajiv Gandhi in 1984. "He pushed India's strategic objectives and posture further than any Indian leader before or after him." (Cohen and Dasgupta 2010) It was during his leadership that India pursued some ambitious strategic projects, starting with Operation Meghdoot in 1984 (April 13, 1984) which was against Pakistan in the Siachen Glacier. Even though India proudly wore myriad shades of success in this operation, till date it is responsible for heavy drains in the country's military resources. Rajiv Gandhi also worked towards enhancing India's military modernisation, by restarting its nuclear programme as well as expanding the economy so as to incorporate more arms trade. It was during his tenure as the PM that India's economy grew at a faster rate than its population. (Cohen and Dasgupta 2010) India now engaged in arms trade with France, the USSR, Germany and Sweden. The corruption scandal that however arose from the arms trade with Sweden resulted in Rajiv Gandhi's defeat in the 1989 elections.

Operation Meghdoot was followed by Operation Brasstacks in 1986. Based on the then Indian Army Chief Gen. Krishnaswami Sundarji's plan for military strategy, Brasstacks involved a massive military exercise on the Indo-Pak border in Rajasthan. The essence of the plan was to have "highly mobile strike corps of mechanised and armoured infantry backed by air power that could potentially strike deep inside Pakistan with lightning speed without the need for elaborate and time-consuming mobilisation." (Ill 2007) At the same time, it also intended to gauge Pakistan's defence system and the level of reaction of its allies. The result of this was Pakistan's threat to use nuclear weapons, forcing India to back down. While it was described as a simple military exercise, Sundarji in a statement explained how this operation was India's last chance to settle the Kashmir issue by invading Pakistan and bulwarking their nuclear programme. (Cohen and Dasgupta 2010)

Brasstacks was succeeded by Rajiv Gandhi's most famous strategic assertion in 1987 when he sent the IPKF to Sri Lanka to manage a peacekeeping deal he attempted to foster between the Sri Lankan Government and the Tamil Tigers. Also known as Operation Pawan, this move of Rajiv Gandhi resulted in more loss of Indian soldiers than in any independent conflict India was involved in before. "The LTTE and political hierarchy of Sri Lanka were completely misread. General Sundarji had an equation with Rajiv Gandhi but the politico-military connect per se was still not institutionalized." (Katoch 2012) While the IPKF was sent with the primary motive of ensuring that hostilities between the Tamil Separatists and the Sri Lankan Government were at the bare minimum, the situation turned towards the course of a full military confrontation when the Tamil Separatists refused to disarm themselves. "The Indian Army had never experienced a war like this before. They were in an unfamiliar land against a recondite enemy that wore no uniforms, followed no Geneva Convention on ethics of war and yet carried lethal contemporary armaments and battled customarily from behind the cover of women and children." (Tewari 2017) While many claim this decision to be highly misleading and thus an incorrect one, India's intervention in Sri Lanka could have given it a stronger foothold in the Indian Ocean Region. Hasty and ill-prepared withdrawal of troops in 1989 by the V. P. Singh government completely tarnished the reputation of the Indian Army by affirming that it can be defeated by a group of guerrilla fighters. This was done after the then president of Sri Lanka Ranasinghe Premadasa asked the IPKF to leave the country. Sri Lanka came to be then known as India's Vietnam and India's inability to tackle insurgency became an advantageous tool for Pakistan, who then encouraged massive insurgencies in Kashmir. (Cohen and Dasgupta 2010)

The crisis in Sri Lanka cascaded into the Maldives when India once again intervened to quell an emerging coup by foreign mercenaries, who were none other than the members of the PLOTE. Even though the PLOTE signed an agreement with both India and Sri Lanka and thus joined the political mainstream, their attack on the Maldives came as a shock to New Delhi, which in turn prompted their decision to send in their troops in Male. Known as Operation Cactus, it came about in 1988 after Maldives' sitting president and military dictator Maumoon Abdul Gayoom asked India for military aid. (Arafat 2018)

The period from 1990 marked the start of India's involvement in a "low-intensity conflict" with Pakistan. Mainly asymmetric in nature, other features of this include limited use of forces, restricted to a particular area and a lower threshold of weaponry or use of mainly small arms. India's conflict with Pakistan during this period of time can also be described as a terror-upgrade in J&K, which began in 1989 when armed resistance against India's rule in Kashmir began, to which Pakistan guaranteed to provide "moral and diplomatic" support. (Hashim 2014) In 1990, the inception of Rashtriya Rifles took place, when the insurgency levels in Kashmir were at their peak. With their one point agenda, Rashtriya Rifles were a game-changer and soon became the most feared counter-insurgency force in Kashmir. By neutralising over 8,000 militants and capturing 6,000, the Rashtriya Rifles became a nightmare for militants in Kashmir. (A. Banerjee n.d.) Insurgency in Kashmir took a major toll on Indian Military Resources, which could be seen clearly by 1993. The Indian Army had two of its ten corps and seven of its thirty infantry divisions based in Kashmir with approximately 150,000 troops involved in counter-insurgency missions. (Clary 2017)

The progress of developments in Kashmir took a major turn in 1998. For that matter, India's footing in the global political arena took a massive turn in the same year for it was during this year that the historic Pokhran-II test took place, India's second nuclear test. The "Vajpayee government boldly pushed India across the threshold of declared nuclear weapon status" thereby "ending its record of self-restraint" (Perkovich 1996) when India tested three nuclear weapons on May 11 followed by two on May 13. Pakistan followed suit and tested its nuclear weapons on May 28. The test of 1998 "shocked the world, particularly because they were done with utmost secrecy and the India-US ties hit rock bottom." (Sreenivasan 2018) While there is no doubt about the fact that the overall international reaction against Pokhran-II was negative, the reaction had several distinctive characteristics. Some countries such as the USA, Canada and Japan imposed economic sanctions on India as a means to show their take on India's nuclear testing, and a few such as

Australia imposed a ban on ministerial level talks. USA, France, Russia and UK also sought diplomatic engagements with India so as to convince India to take a slightly different nuclear stance and join the NPT. (A. Kapur 2001)

The intrusion by Pakistan Army into the Kargil Area resulted in the launch of Operation Vijay by India in May 1999, more commonly known as the Kargil War. This was India and Pakistan's first ever conflict as nuclear nations which was triggered when insurgents from Pakistan and Kashmiri militants took up posts on the Indian side of the LoC in Kargil and gave strategic advantage to Pakistan. Kargil was once again the offshoot of the Kashmir dispute. (Nasri n.d.) "The conflict took place under the nuclear umbrella but without a full-scale mobilization of the army." (Clary 2017) The IAF played a crucial role in India's victory by dropping laser-guided bombs on Pakistani bunkers after obtaining GPS images of their accurate location on the hilltops. At the same time, India at a diplomatic level, very efficiently exposed the duplicity in Pakistani leadership, thus showing how its military and diplomatic strategy was working hand-in-hand. Another major smart move taken by India strategically was to attack the Pakistani forces during the night thereby taking them by surprise.

Kargil provided India with two essential strategic lessons. Firstly, India realised that its take on nuclearising itself as a means to dampen the possibility of conventional warfare with Pakistan was misleading. When it came down to dealing with Regional Warfare with both Pakistan and China, India needed to not only develop its nuclear arsenal but conventional warfare arsenal as well. Secondly, nuclear deterrence played a very vital role in the way the war shaped out. Both Pakistan and India were on the same page when they felt that Kashmir was not worth a nuclear holocaust. India may have used the air force and ground force in a complementary manner so as to achieve their victory, both the countries duly maintained the boundary between nuclear and conventional warfare. (A. Kapur 2001) Pakistan, on the other hand, once again strengthened their belief in using violence in the form of Low-Intensity Conflict (LIC) as a means of achieving political objectives, even though they once again failed in gauging the international environment and how unsupportive it would be on Pakistan's position on Kashmir, leading to their eventual international isolation. (RAND.org n.d.)

India entered the twenty-first century with high tensions at the border in Kashmir. This escalated into the December 2001 Parliament Attacks which brought one of the largest democracies of the world to a standstill when five heavily armed militants entered the Indian Parliament, with the primary aim of inflicting maximum damage, but ultimately failing to do so. This incident moved India and Pakistan once again to the brink of a major war with India

mobilising its military machine and Pakistan moving its troops in reaction to India's mobilisation. "Over 500,000 Indian troops were mobilised in the first stage of deployment. Indian Navy and Air Force were put on high alert and the army was prepared to strike 'high-value' targets inside Pakistan." (Gupta 2016) This was known in India by the code name of Operation Parakram and envisaged a ten-month long intense stand-off between the two newly emerged nuclear countries. This was the first nuclear crisis of the twenty-first century with both the countries "implicitly exploring new areas of nuclear strategy." (Coll 2006) The stand-off came to end in 2002 only after international mediation. (Hashim 2014)

It was after the conclusion of Operation Parakram in 2002 that the Cold Start Doctrine found its place in Indian Military Strategy. India took over two months to fully mobilise and deploy its troops at the Pakistan border during the operation, after which defence strategists felt that India is in need of a new defence strategy to enable it to mobilise and deploy its forces on a few days' notice. Cold Start Doctrine thus implies swift deployment of forces on India's western borders in case of a full-blown war. It aimed at developing a model of network-centric warfare based on well-planned geographical distribution of forces. (Desk 2017)

India soon shifted from its policy of "non-alignment" to the policy of "poly-alignment." Some of the primary characteristics of this include a marked increase in the number of countries India was involved with in terms of defence agreements, which went from seven in 2000 to 26 in 2008. Adding to this, military exercises (both bilateral and multilateral) became an endearing feature of India's defence relationships. India became a key player in the Indian Ocean Region and fostered healthy relations with all the nations that supported this ambition of India and lastly, India also got involved in the peacekeeping operations led by the UN. (Ganguly 2015)

Till about 2010, India mainly focused on dealing with Pakistan and their double standards which were now seen countless times on the global front. After 2010, India opted for using limited offensive capability not only against Pakistan in J&K but also in the North-East against China. Changes were incorporated in the Long Term Integrated Perspective Plan 2012–2027 (LTIPP), which led to the added deployment of around 100,000 troops against China in the North-East region of India. The new proactive strategy enabled it to now deal with threats on both the eastern and western frontiers of India. (Sufyan 2011)

The time period from 2000 onwards also witnessed growth in India's international relations in terms of its nuclear agreements with various countries, the landmark one being its nuclear agreement with the USA,

which was initiated in 2005 and signed in 2008. In the same year, India also signed the agreement on peaceful use of Nuclear Weapons with France. This was followed by similar nuclear agreements with Russia and Canada in 2010, Australia in 2014, the UK in 2015, Japan in 2016 and most recently with Bangladesh in April 2017. (Energy 2018)

During the ten years of the UPA Government, India's defence reputation was riddled more with scandals than with actual concrete achievements, convincing many critics to term the then Defence Minister of India A. K. Antony as India's worse defence minister. The year 2014 in this respect once again brought a change in Indian politics when Narendra Modi was elected as India's 14th Prime Minister. Strongly in favour of making India self-reliant in the field of defence production (Nanda 2014) Modi surely came into the government with huge military ambitions for India. The highlight of his military agenda was to make Pakistan pay, which was seen in 2016 during India's famous Surgical Strike against Pakistan, which happened on September 29, 2016, eleven days after the horrific Uri attack on September 18, 2016. As a part of these strikes, India attacked "terrorist 'launch-pads' in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK), killing an indeterminate number of them, including some Pakistani soldiers." (Jagannathan 2016) This step of the Indian Armed Forces made the Army not only cross the LoC but also the self-imposed line of strategic restraint by Indian political leadership from time immemorial.

The year 2017 also was an important year for the Indian Armed Forces due to the Doklam stand-off that took place between the Indian and Chinese forces at the Doklam Plateau in Ladakh. Triggered by Bhutan's warning to India regarding Chinese construction of roads in the disputed border region after which the emerging nuclear neighbours sent their respective troops to get involved in a three-month intense stand-off from June 16 till August 28. While New Delhi and Beijing called for mediating the situation by initiating peaceful talks, no one was ready to take the first step in withdrawing their respective troops. Securing the Doklam plateau is of huge strategic relevance for India as it acts as a land corridor connecting India's Northeastern States. (AP 2017)

The military events of 2017 were succeeded by informal talks between PM Modi and the Chinese President Xi Jinping in April 2018 which helped relieve some of the historically perpetrated tensions between the two nations, due to Modi's personal diplomacy. (A. Singh 2018) A major paradigm shift was also brought about in India's military affairs during the same time by the establishment of the Defence Policy Committee (DPC), under the NSA. Set up as a permanent body, the DPC aimed at facilitating comprehensive and integrated defence planning in order to enhance India's defence preparedness.

The DPC includes some of the brilliant minds in the field of civil and military administration and thus includes the three Service Chiefs, Defence Secretary, Foreign Secretary and Secretary (Expenditure) from the Ministry of Finance. The fundamental duties of the DPC are two-fold and comprise analysis and evaluation of all relevant inputs to defence planning along with preparing drafts for India's national security strategy, strategic defence reviews and international defence engagement strategy, to mention a few. (L. K. Behera 2018)

Conclusion

India's approach towards defence started with a sheer lack of intuitive thought in 1947 where defence planning was looked at through the prism of strategic restraint and maintenance of peace. After India's war over Kashmir in 1947-48 with Pakistan, India realised the importance of military preparedness. Yet till about the Bangladesh war in 1971, India's military strategy was solely based on deliberation and implementation of tactics on the basis of how grave the situation was on the external front, as could be seen in all the major wars India gallantly fought. However, over the course of time Indian administration made sure to acknowledge the take-aways from each of their major war experiences and incorporate them in their next strategies. For example, the war of 1965 made the government realise the value of a well-developed intelligence system and hence RAW was founded in 1968.

The military experience India has gained during the last 70 years has only now made India realise the importance of systematic defence planning, which could be seen in the establishment of the DPC earlier this year. While there is no doubt about the fact that the personality cult of leaders and politicians alike was something that changed the course of India's military posture from being defensive in the initial stages to now being a complementary combination of offensive and defensive posture, leader personality is something that has also immensely bulwarked India's military development at several junctures with some very harsh implications for the country on the national as well as global fronts.

Keeping these in mind, India's strategy for national security should be planned in a way that not only creates a harmony between India's diplomatic ambitions at the international level but also instil stability in areas that have been ridden with conflict and violence for a considerable time. At this stage, India needs to not only deal efficiently with the issues it faces with its neighbours on the western and eastern fronts but also the internal security problems that have emerged as a result of the former. This can only be possible when a national strategy is devised in a manner that envisages of all

aspects of defence planning in a holistic manner. The advent of the twenty-first century has brought India to a stage where it is dealing with complex problems such as cyber-terrorism. As Modi correctly agrees, economic development is the mother lode of military development, thereby making the need for India to establish a thread of synchrony between the two extremely crucial.

Notes

1. The clauses for the same include Mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty; Mutual non-aggression; Mutual non-interference; Equality and Cooperation for Mutual Benefit and Peaceful Co-Existence.
2. The term "Forward Policy" implies to taking up of positions in the inhospitable terrain of eastern Ladakh, along the McMahon Line in Arunachal Pradesh, to reiterate their claim over it.
3. This enabled the Indian Army to quickly take matters into their own hands and push Pakistani forces out of Kashmir.
4. Ironically, even in 1971, Pakistan was supported by both China and the USA even though it was responsible for carrying out massive genocide against the inhabitants of East Bengal due to their demands of better and equal political representation.
It is a series of development projects that connects the two provinces in China and Pakistan. This includes roads, railways, pipelines and hydropower plants. The entire project comes under the broader umbrella of China's "One Belt One Road" project wherein they are working on creating a new Silk Road.
5. Military vehicles were provided by Canada and America. Adding to this, India lacked an aircraft industry or even repair facilities during that time.
6. This is with reference to the Japanese incursions in Bay of Bengal and Assam along with their role in the development of the Azad Hind Fauj or the Indian National Army (INA).
7. Nehru and S. C. Bose (eventual leader of the INA) then chose to share their opinions which were strongly in contrast to the prevailing orthodox INC ideology. They called for the development of the military based on public ownership of defence industries.
8. The Blackett Report written by the British Physicist P. M. S Blackett in 1948, further this stance of Nehru. It suggested reduction in military expenditure in order to fast-track the process of economic development.
9. Refer to the link <http://www.friendsoftibet.org/main/sardar.html> for the letter Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel wrote to Nehru.
10. The plan also took into account the availability of resources and the kind of military assistance India could get from friendly foreign relations. Broadly, there were six main objectives of this plan, which includes expansion of the R&D wing; modernisation but not expansion of the Navy; Infrastructural improvements in the border areas; Expansion of the Army and modernisation of the weapons and equipment it used; Expansion of the domestic defence production base; and lastly Modernisation of the IAF and its stabilisation.
11. The split was mainly based on ideology. Mao Zedong (Leader of China) had a completely different take on communism as against Joseph Stalin (Leader of Russia). In other words, the nature of development of the communist ideologies in China and the USSR were highly distinctive and this eventually resulted in massive diplomatic and military conflict between the two nations.
12. The USSR aided in setting up the Bhilai Steel Plant in 1955.
13. The USA was suspicious of the Indian motives from the time India became a part of the Non-Aligned Movement. Adding to this, their main basis for giving military aid to Pakistan was considering the fact that it was a member of the SEATO and CENTO.

14. The government realised that the process of attaining self-sufficiency in arms production would be a long-term process. Thus plans had to be formulated in a way that covered this aspect.
15. Refer to (C. Smith 1994), pages 88-89 for thorough details on why the dip in USSR-India relations took place.
16. As per the agreement, Indian scientists got access to Canadian Reactors for research purposes. Refer to (Sen 2017), pages 94-97 for further information

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