
A Predictive Analysis of the J&K Militancy

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***Abstract:** The recent Amarnath Yatra land controversy is only a continuation of Hindu-Muslim hostility in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) that dates back to the start of the militancy. It does not by itself signify an increase in anti-Indian sentiment in the Kashmir Valley. Using the Amarnath land issue to gauge the level of popular support enjoyed by militants is, thus, a mistake. The two are not connected. Moreover, since 1990, Pakistan has itself weakened the separatist movement by marginalising any militant group that did not support accession to it.*

India has managed to exploit the Pakistani mistakes in Kashmir to its own advantage. Since an overwhelming majority of Kashmiris favour independence over accession to Pakistan, pro-Pakistani militants in the state enjoy very little popular support. Their recruitment base is confined to religious organisations like the Jamaat-e-Islami which too, has recently begun to distance itself from militancy. By carefully controlling its use of military force in the state, the Indian decision-making establishment has avoided widening this recruitment base.

As a result, anti-Indian sentiment in Kashmir is presently too diffused to pose a serious threat to the established authority. Although rogue operations by foreign mercenaries and local Islamists are likely, given Pakistan's continuing sponsorship of them, the post 9/11 international mood is in India's favour. Pakistan will strive to drive up violence levels in the state while maintaining plausible deniability, which will help India to contain the violence through military means alone. There shall, thus, be no need to compromise with either the separatists or Islamabad over the status of J&K.

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Introduction

This paper shall examine whether India can retain the Kashmir Valley by force over the coming years. It argues that the limited reliance which Indian policy-makers have hitherto placed on coercive measures has mitigated the degree of local alienation. As a result, calibrated and discriminate suppression of Pakistan-trained militants (both indigenous and foreign) can be sustained *ad infinitum*. The worst years of militancy are over.

By adopting a principled and restrained counter-insurgency posture during the early 1990s, New Delhi managed to ride out an initial wave of highly concentrated popular anger. Today, the same anger persists but it is diffused and multi-directional. Instead of just the Indian government, Kashmiri disillusionment is also targeted at Islamabad which manipulated the separatist movement to serve its own narrow strategic interests.

For this reason, neither the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) nor its terrorist surrogates could seize control of the large-scale agitations which wracked Kashmir in mid-2008.¹ The latter essentially remained spontaneous protests by a populace unconcerned with any agenda more ambitious than grievance redressal. Although the ISI has long tried to engineer a conflagration between Hindus and Muslims in J&K, when an opportunity came by, it was a mere spectator.

Such a situation did not result from Pakistani goodwill, but from a sustained policy of conflict management that denied the ISI any further inroads into the Kashmiri polity. Except for known pro-Pakistani sycophants such as the odd Islamist leader, Kashmiri politicians did not attempt to steer events in a direction that would bring the prospect of accession to Pakistan any closer.²

Similarly, anti-American sentiment is also on the rise in Kashmir, which has lost the separatist movement much of the international respectability that it once enjoyed. Although Islamists in the region would like to pursue a dual-faceted policy of calling upon Washington to pressure New Delhi while simultaneously cheerleading for an anti-US *jihād*, such a policy is no longer viable. After 9/11, the Kashmiri militants were catapulted into an international system where ambiguity had no place in the war on terror.³ Today, every mass-casualty terror attack in India that has an Islamist tinge detracts from the legitimacy of their cause.

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Currently, India is not at risk of having to choose between suppressing or yielding to a popular uprising in the Kashmir Valley. However, local politicians in both the Jammu and Kashmir regions might continue to exploit communal faultlines with a view to gaining electoral advantage in the forthcoming Assembly elections. This will lead to public disturbances and communal clashes which can, however, be controlled by the intervention of secular leaders and the central government in New Delhi. Meanwhile, the war of attrition against pro-Pakistani militant groups will grind on relentlessly.

Factors Influencing the Course of Militancy

Tracking the strategic trends at play in the J&K militancy requires acknowledgement of three basic realities. First, since 1947, there has always been an Islamist fringe within the state that defied all logic and favoured accession to Pakistan purely on grounds of religious solidarity.⁴ Neither the atrocities committed by Pakistani raiders in 1947 nor mercenary depredations in the Valley since 1995 could shake this fringe's commitment to joining Pakistan. So, the fact that a number of Kashmiris persist in chanting pro-Pakistani slogans even after twenty years of militancy should not come as a shock to anyone.

Secondly, the levers that control the quantum of violence in the Valley lie not in Srinagar but in Islamabad. The successful marginalisation of any militant group that attempted to exercise strategic autonomy allowed the ISI to retain overall command of the proxy war. Any effort towards predicting the success or failure of conflict resolution initiatives by India must take into account Pakistan's ability to act as a 'spoiler'. In fact, part of the reason why India has succeeded in preventing the secession of Kashmir since 1989 is because it exploited this tendency of Pakistan to crush moderate Kashmiri voices.

Lastly, the growing rift between Jammu's Hindus and Kashmiri Muslims might be deplorable from a liberal-humanitarian perspective, but it has been a long time coming. From its very inception, the Kashmiri separatist movement was a communal one. Over 1,000 Kashmiri Pandits were killed and the homes of 30,000 destroyed in an ultimately successful bid to cleanse the Valley of Hindus.⁵ Although it is tempting to romanticise the now toothless pro-independence militant groups as secular nationalists, their actions on the ground during the early 1990s were decidedly communal.

Thus, none of the events that generated so much alarm in the Indian media during the summer of 2008 indicates a radical departure from past trends. All that really happened was an intensification of the latent hostility between

Hindus in Jammu and Muslims in Kashmir. The Islamists saw this as an opportunity to dust off their green flags and chant pro-Pakistan slogans once again, after a long break from protesting against the Indian presence in Kashmir. Meanwhile, Pakistan remained too weak and distracted by internal threats to systematically exploit disaffection in Kashmir.

The net result is a situation which could have been a major diplomatic embarrassment for India, but which ended up as an inter-regional spat between Jammu and Kashmir. By extending massive support to the separatist movement since 1989, the Pakistani establishment deliberately raised the stakes in Kashmir. These stakes are now pegged at a level where New Delhi simply cannot take major policy decisions based on impressionistic assessments.⁶ Irrespective of how bad newspaper columnists or one-time Booker authors perceive the situation in J&K to be, India is not about to pull out. Not until and unless a majority of the Kashmiri population becomes *both* alienated from India and sympathetic to Pakistan. Currently, such a scenario seems highly unlikely.

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The Separatists' Fatal Miscalculation

When the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) initiated armed rebellion in the Valley in July 1988, it banked on the prospect of eventual Pakistani military intervention. Just as India had invaded East Pakistan to create an independent Bangladesh, so the Kashmiri separatists believed that Pakistan would do the same to India. Alternatively, they engaged in wishful thinking that New Delhi might over time just lose the will to retain Kashmir. How to proactively bring about this happy state of events was not a matter that the separatist leadership thought through.⁷

Central to the JKLF's logic was a pre-conception that Pakistan was merely out to aid another Muslim country (Kashmir) and to exact vengeance for the humiliation of 1971. Not enough thought was given to the possibility that Pakistan might harbour expansionist designs of its own, and that the existence of an independent Kashmir would actually be a denial of the principles that had created Pakistan in the first place. If a Muslim-majority region like Kashmir could have a sovereign identity, what was to prevent Sindh or Baluchistan from breaking away from Punjabi hegemony?⁸ Although the existence of an

independent Bangladesh posed no threat to India's identity as a secular democratic state (if that was what the Bangladeshis themselves wanted), the same logic did not apply to Pakistan vis-à-vis Kashmir.

Failure to anticipate that Islamabad would undermine the pro-independence movement and assist only those militants who favoured accession to Pakistan was the JKLF's big mistake. While JKLF cadres used Islamic symbols and discourse to justify their atrocities, they differed from the radical Islamists in that they did not believe religious commonality automatically made Kashmir part of Pakistan.⁹ Owing to this difference of perception, the ground was set very early on for a parting of ways between the JKLF and the ISI-Islamist combine.

By nurturing the belief that international opinion would favour Kashmiri independence, the separatists got inveigled into taking precipitate action to break away from India. The consequences of this miscalculation were apparent soon enough. Satisfied that it had succeeded in igniting a popular anti-Indian rebellion in Kashmir, the ISI abandoned the JKLF in 1990 in favour of an Islamist group, the Hizbul Mujahideen (HM). Created out of defectors from the JKLF and religious-minded youths recruited by the Kashmir branch of the Jamaat-e-Islami, the Hizbul favoured accession to Pakistan.¹⁰

Caught between a cessation of Pakistani support, on the one hand, and an Indian counter-insurgency offensive, on the other, the JKLF suffered heavy losses. Ironically, it was the only militant group in the early 1990s that might have enjoyed a genuine measure of popular support. By undermining the JKLF, the ISI inadvertently scored an own goal because it facilitated the Indian agenda of splitting the militants from their popular support base. Unlike the JKLF, the Hizbul Mujahideen derived its power primarily from the military hardware and funds supplied to it by the ISI and the Pakistani branch of the Jamaat-e-Islami.

Alienation with Pakistan Sets in

With the benefit of hindsight, it is possible to say that Pakistan erred in eroding the JKLF's military capability at the same time that India launched a crackdown in Kashmir. Between 1990 and 1994, the ISI converted what had originally been a mass uprising against Indian rule in Kashmir into a pro-Pakistan movement with a much narrower support base. Only committed Islamists were prepared to believe that Kashmir was bound to join Pakistan, and that the people's verdict on the matter counted for little. While a handful of quislings were always available to champion this view, most Kashmiris were unconvinced.¹¹

Muslims in Kashmir adhere to a mystic Sufi tradition of Islam in which reverence for local religious practices and shrines is not anathema, as it is in fundamentalist Islam.¹² Those Kashmiris who advocated accession to Pakistan were basically fundamentalists, since they did not accept that cultural differences constituted a barrier to political unification of Muslim populations. By pressing for merger with Pakistan, they contradicted two basic principles in whose defence the anti-Indian rebellion was supposed to have originated in the first place.

One of these was the defence of *Kashmiriyat* – the region's cultural distinctness. Afraid of losing their identity in an India where Hindu nationalism was becoming a powerful political force, many Kashmiris grew hostile to the thought of further integration with the national mainstream. During the 1980s, this trend was accelerated, as communal violence across the rest of India created a sense of Muslim insecurity. Eager to resist the forward march of *Hindutva*, the Muslim population of Kashmir grew susceptible to militant appeals couched in religious undertones.¹³ At the core of these appeals was, however, a desire to preserve their cultural heritage in all its distinctness, and not to have it merely subsumed within a broader Islamic identity.

By calling for accession to Pakistan, the Islamists with their fundamentalist agenda were in opposition to the very concept of *Kashmiriyat*. According to them, religious commonality trumped ethnic and linguistic differences between Pakistan and Kashmir. Initially, this contradiction was not perceived by the majority of Kashmiris, since the anti-Indian rebellion was in theory masterminded from Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (PoK), and not from Pakistan itself. For a while, it appeared as though the separatist movement was a fight against the Government of India by the peoples of both Indian and Pakistani-administered Kashmir.¹⁴ However, with the passage of time, Indian attrition of militant groups forced the latter to recruit increasingly from the Pakistani heartland. Gradually, the myth of an indigenous Kashmiri uprising got exposed and the reality of a proxy war controlled directly from Islamabad became too obvious to ignore.

The second mistake made by the Islamists was to cavalierly dismiss any notion that the Kashmiri people had a right to self-determination. Kashmir

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would have to join Pakistan, and there was no room for argument on this point. By foreclosing the independence option, which resonated strongly with a large number of Kashmiris, the Islamists completely ignored public opinion in the Valley. They, thus, appeared no less dictatorial than the corrupt local elites against whose rule the rebellion had originally broken out. If the rigging of the 1987 State Assembly elections was anti-democratic, so was the arbitrariness with which the Islamists blocked out differing points of view.¹⁵

Hostility towards the Islamists in Kashmir boiled over when a highly respected religious leader called Qazi Nissar Ahmed was assassinated in June 1994. The Hizbul Mujahideen was thought to have carried out the killing upon instructions from the ISI, which wanted to silence moderate Kashmiri politicians. At the Qazi's funeral, thousands of angry mourners chanted *Jo mangega Pakistan, usko milega kabristan* (whoever asks for Pakistan shall get a grave). Alarmed by the outpouring of anti-Islamist sentiment, the Hizbul threatened to assassinate anyone who did not retract their statements against Pakistan.¹⁶

The Mercenary Invasion of Kashmir and Attritional Warfare

Through its own impatience to seize control over the separatist rebellion, Islamabad showed its hand and alienated the vast majority of Kashmiris. The latter realised that if the movement were to succeed, they would merely exchange one oppressor for another. Moreover, the undemocratic and feudal nature of the Pakistani polity made it appear even more capable of brutal repression than India was. By 1994, the human rights situation in the Valley had begun to improve as New Delhi focussed on improving its international image. Simultaneously, Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto explicitly ruled out the possibility of an independent Kashmir.¹⁷ Her statement contributed to the JKLF's decision to declare a unilateral ceasefire with the Indian government in 1994.

Meanwhile, the Indian security forces had avoided inflaming Kashmiri resentment any further than was absolutely necessary. Having learnt from the mistakes made by the Pakistan Army in Bangladesh, the Indian Army did not opt for waging a war of annihilation when it was inducted into counter-insurgency duties in Kashmir. Rather than deliver a single knock-out blow, the army focussed on wearing down separatist groups through attrition and a well-calibrated rotation of troops through the state. Given the huge manpower pool that the army could recruit from and the relatively tiny recruitment base available to the separatists, this was a sensible strategy. It avoided the use of heavy artillery and air power, and, thus, minimised collateral damage.¹⁸

Faced with the local Islamists being bled white by the Indian Army and with little other support for accession to Pakistan, the ISI inducted foreign mercenaries into the conflict. Once again, this step proved beneficial for Pakistan in the short run but was ultimately counter-productive. It created a link between the Kashmir militancy and Pan-Islamist terrorist groups operating out of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border areas.¹⁹ Thus, after 9/11, India was able to make a strong case that it was fighting the same enemy as the US, and that the ISI was heavily involved in supporting international terrorism. Even though there were practical limits as to how far Washington could pressure Islamabad to roll back its support for militancy, Indian coercive diplomacy yielded results on other fronts.

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As a compromise between ignoring India's concerns and antagonising Pakistan, the United States facilitated the strengthening of counter-infiltration measures along the Line of Control (LoC).²⁰ An elaborate surveillance system consisting of an electrified fence, battlefield radars and pickets armed with night vision devices was created. This succeeded in dramatically bringing down the level of violence in the state. Owing to greater vigilance along the border, which was primarily made possible by technology sourced from the West, attrition rates in Kashmir increased massively. At present, the number of militants being killed in counter-insurgency operations in the state is far greater than the number of replacements arriving from across the border.²¹

Between 1995 and 2003, militancy in Jammu and Kashmir was dominated by foreign mercenaries. Their activities were felt far more in the Hindu-dominated Jammu region, in the form of repeated massacres of Hindu villagers.²² Usually, such killings took place with a degree of informational support from local Muslims. Such complicity in the actions of militants who were not even indigenous to the state severely frayed Hindu-Muslim relations in Jammu. Doda district, with its vast area, rugged terrain and narrow Muslim majority, was a favourite target of the mercenaries. On several occasions from 1995 onwards, district administration officials apprehended that communal violence could break out as a result of terrorist attacks.

The Nebulous Issue of ‘Popular Support’

Two points need to be acknowledged on the prevalence of anti-Indian sentiment in Kashmir: it is extremely difficult to gauge accurately, and it is not the only ‘anti’ sentiment in the region. Also present are strong anti-Pakistan sentiments. The latter are, however, less heard owing to the ever-present risk of assassination. That does not mean they do not exist. For instance, the murder of leading Kashmiri intellectuals in 1990-94 by pro-Pakistani militants did not win the latter any hearts and minds in the Valley.²³ Qazi Nissar Ahmed was just one of these slain leaders. Mirwaiz Mohammad Farooq (killed in 1990) was another. Abdul Ghani Lone was gunned down in May 2002, barely five hours after he decried the activities of foreign militants in Kashmir.

One reason why the All Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC) is virtually defunct as a coordination forum for militancy is that several of its members remain suspicious of Islamabad.²⁴ Moreover, since 1999, they have been witness to the rampant abuse of state power in Pakistan for the purpose of preserving military rule. Even when democracy was restored to the country in early 2008, its arrival was marred by terrorist attacks from the same mercenary groups that are intent on ‘liberating’ Kashmir. Unless the Kashmiris are susceptible to mass amnesia, they are unlikely to forget the lack of democratic freedoms that have characterised Pakistani politics over the last decade.

Unfortunately, ascertaining the true feelings of Kashmiris with regard to India can only be done through massive surveys conducted by the security forces. For this, an exercise like Operation Rakshak II in Punjab needs to be conducted. During the period 1992-93, Indian Army personnel fighting Khalistani militancy in Punjab interacted informally with villagers across the state and built up a profile of the popular mood. It emerged that, contrary to the commentary that was filling newspaper op-ed pages at the time, the vast majority of rural Sikhs only wanted a return to normalcy. They did not care for the Khalistanis, but were too afraid to openly oppose them and instead meekly complied with their dictates. The then police chief of Punjab, K P S Gill, later described this condition as a “societal Stockholm syndrome”.²⁵

Gill has argued against using impressionistic accounts to estimate the level of popular support enjoyed by anti-state elements anywhere. His warning holds true for Kashmir also. Just because 300,000 people demonstrated in Srinagar in August 2008 does not automatically mean the people of Kashmir uniformly desire separation from India. During the height of militancy in Punjab, the funerals of notorious terrorist killers attracted many thousands of villagers. What seemed at the time to be a popular outpouring of grief turned out upon

closer examination to be entirely a farce staged by the deceased terrorists' comrades and enforced through fear of the gun.

Undoubtedly, the level of Kashmiri alienation against India is high, but is it more intensive than extensive? From the very beginning of the militancy in 1988, the epicentre of rebellion has been the urban population of the Kashmir Valley.²⁶ Jammu and Ladakh, as is well known to scholars, actively support greater integration of J&K state with India. Rural Kashmiris, for their part, have always been less radical than their urban counterparts owing to the benefits they

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derived from land reforms implemented during the 1950s.²⁷ This does not mean that the rural youth cannot feel alienation from India, as harassment by security forces angers even the most apolitical of people. What it does signify is that the genuinely ideological support base of militancy is confined to Valley towns.

These are the areas that are most likely to be covered by the Indian print and electronic media during political crises. They are also only a small part of the overall psychological profile of J&K. Voter turnouts in the state have always been on the high side, even in elections where no charges of rigging were made, such as the 2002 Assembly elections.²⁸ This suggests that even as some Kashmiris denounce Indian democracy and call for the establishment of *Nizam-e-Mustafa*, many others are concerned with more temporal means of socio-economic progress.

Continuing Islamisation: A Long-term Subversive Threat

Despite such reassuring signs, there is one trend in the Valley which is highly disturbing. This is continuing presence of local Islamists and the survival of their political legitimacy. Contributing to this trend have been the machinations of mainstream political parties and current trends in international politics. The success of Kosovo in seceding from Serbia and the stalling of US-led counter-terrorism efforts in Afghanistan are among the factors currently keeping the Islamists' hopes alive.²⁹

One would have thought that nearly two decades of trying and failing to break away from India would have discredited the pro-Pakistani militants comprehensively. This has not happened because they found a new agenda to latch onto and keep fighting. Militancy in Kashmir is now wired into the global anti-American *jihād*. With the invasion of Iraq, part of the discourse favoured by

Islamists worldwide that Islam is under threat, has apparently been validated.³⁰ As India draws closer to the United States, the now-defunct pro-independence groups will realise that they are simply not important enough for Washington to antagonise New Delhi. One of the biggest planks upon which the separatist movement based its initial hopes of success – that international pressure would force India to grant independence – has been removed.

For the radical Islamists, however, the real war is only just beginning. Creeping communalisation of Indian society as a whole has also been reflected in J&K, hence, the mutual hostility between Jammu residents and Kashmiris over the Amarnath land transfer. Such a state of events provides religious fundamentalists with strong propaganda for recruitment among underemployed youth. With Pakistan ready to assist with training in explosives handling, one shall increasingly see use of improvised explosive devices, particularly against soft targets. Attacks shall become less frequent, as intensified pressure from the security forces shall compel many cadres to go inactive until the situation changes.

Helping the terrorists shall be the proclivity of mainstream political parties to capitalise on Islamist slogans for electoral advantage. The National Conference started this process during the 1970s, in order to cut into the Jamaat-e-Islami's votebank.³¹ Subsequently, the People's Democratic Party (PDP) did the same. With the Jamaat now seen as retreating from active support of militancy, there is a scramble among mainstream parties to win over its constituency.³² Hence, leaders of the PDP have made statements calling for the introduction of Pakistani currency in Kashmir.³³ During the recent Amarnath land transfer crisis, some even made statements suggesting they preferred to deal with PoK than with Jammu and the rest of the Indian Union.

Such statements are alarming only because they sustain the morale of militant groups, which are otherwise in a state of flux and uncertain about their future. The reduction of overt support from Pakistan after a ceasefire came into effect along the LoC in November 2003 hit them hard.³⁴ Now encouraging signs are once again emanating from the Pakistan Army, which has unilaterally violated the ceasefire on a number of occasions in 2008. Further transgressions are likely to take place, since the army now has a civilian government to act as a front for its proxy war in Kashmir. Plausible deniability in covert trans-border operations can be better exploited with a democratic government in power. This is because Washington will be loath to exert pressure on Islamabad for fear of destabilising it.

Overall, the stage seems set for a qualitative (but not quantitative) upgradation of militancy in Kashmir. Terrorist operations will be carried out by

highly motivated Islamist cadres, but shall still occur far less frequently than they did during the early 1990s. During that period, the Valley was in a state of mass revolt owing to a concentration of anti-Indian sentiment. Today, Kashmiri resentment is too diffused for a majority of the Valley population to permit pro-Pakistani groups to run riot. For this reason, as well as the greater vigilance being exercised along the LoC, violence in J&K shall remain within levels that are militarily controllable.

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Conclusion

The Indian strategy in Kashmir has three elements: negotiation with militant groups to reach an amicable settlement, attrition of recalcitrant groups, and economic development. The first and third elements have come in for considerable criticism following the Amarnath land agitation. It appears as though repeated efforts by New Delhi to negotiate have only been spurned by the separatist leadership, and economic development has been taken for granted. Despite receiving ten times as much financial aid from the Centre as its population size would warrant, the Valley remains hostile to India.³⁵

Furthermore, since the militants insist that there can be no solution within the Indian Constitution, there are no grounds for mutual compromise. J&K state already enjoys far greater autonomy than any other state in India. Since much of this autonomy was gradually eroded after 1953, its restoration is about as far as New Delhi might be prepared to go in a peace deal.³⁶ However, such 'concessions' are unlikely to appease the Islamists, who only desire to break away from India. Absence of a political space for negotiations suggests that peace talks are a waste of time.

In this situation, the noted columnist Vir Sanghvi has questioned the wisdom of retaining Kashmir any longer. He argues that whatever development has already taken place in the region did nothing to reduce Kashmiri hostility to the rest of India.³⁷ While this is certainly true, it misses a larger point. The real success of India's conflict management approach in the Valley has not been in winning local hearts and minds, but in denying these to Pakistan. Islamabad made a big mistake when it marginalised the pro-independence Kashmiri militants; New Delhi has built on the opportunity, thus, provided.

Had it not been for the limitations which India placed on its own security forces in the early 1990s, popular alienation would have remained focussed on New Delhi. By allowing Pakistan to take the lead in sabotaging the pro-independence movement in the Valley, India partially deflected Kashmiri hostility from itself. This explains why after 9/11, Islamist groups still do not have a widespread following in J&K despite having proselytised in the state since the mid-1970s.³⁸ Their vast network of mosques and *madrassas* has only allowed the Jamaat-e-Islami and Jamiat-e-Ahle Hadith to maintain a foothold in the state, not to trigger off a popular uprising centred around Islamism.

New Delhi has succeeded in preventing the large anti-Indian constituency in the Valley from aligning with the much smaller pro-Pakistani constituency. By keeping the two apart, successive Indian governments have managed to avert a situation wherein a truly massive popular resistance might emerge in the Valley.³⁹ As the events of the early 1990s have shown, even the local police and civil administration in Kashmir would be prepared to join the separatists if they were perceived to enjoy widespread support. That such a course of events has not come to pass since 1993 demonstrates that regardless of continuing disturbances in the Valley, the majority of Kashmiris are not radical.

Notes

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