
Army-Media Relations in Sub-conventional Conflict

R K Nanavatty

Sub-conventional conflict in India primarily constitutes internal armed conflict with or without external involvement. The media plays a significant role: it reports the news, thus, fulfilling the people's right to information, and it holds the government and its forces accountable. The media has a complex relationship with the army and dissident forces.¹ Both the dissident forces and the army seek to use the media: the former for publicity and the latter to keep the people informed of the various developments in the campaign. Unfortunately, a focus on public relations; the inappropriateness of existing organisations, regulations and policies; the absence of suitable mechanisms; inadequate competencies; and a lack of mutual understanding and appreciation constrain the development of purposeful army-media relations.

The aim of this paper is to discuss army-media relations in sub-conventional conflict in India and suggest a way ahead.

Preamble: Sub-conventional Conflict in India

In India, internal conflict is endemic: several well worn reasons contribute to continuing strife within the state and newer causes of friction are emerging. Poor governance exacerbates the situation. Government ambivalence and procrastination cause conflict to simmer – even escalate. Escalation can lead to the use of physical force and in extreme cases the organised use of armed force and violence against the state.

The Constitution of India lays special emphasis on the defence of the union – its cohesion, unity and integrity. Apart from safeguarding the nation against external aggression, it binds the union to protect the states against internal

Lieutenant General R K Nanavatty (Retd) is former General Officer Commanding-in-Chief of the Northern Command.

disturbances. In India, the use of armed force and violence – armed rebellion – to achieve ideological, political, social and economic goals – irrespective of the reason – is unconstitutional. When faced with a serious internal armed threat to the security of the state, the government is obliged to use every legitimate means, including the use of counter-force, to quash the threat and resolve conflict. The use of armed force by dissident forces and the use of counter-force by the government results in internal armed conflict.

Internal armed conflict creates conditions that invite external interference. It encourages an external power, inimical to the state, to nurture, foster and support internal threats. It enables an adversary to intervene directly using covert means or indirectly using non-state actors.

In India, sub-conventional conflict is primarily internal armed conflict. With or without external involvement, it poses the most serious challenge to the security of the state, today.

Internal armed conflict is a civil form of conflict. The root causes, as well as the solutions of the conflict are to be found in the political, social and economic domains. Prevention, mitigation and resolution of conflict are the responsibility of the government. In the main, it is the function of the civil administration and the civil instruments of force. Where the state and central police and paramilitary forces are unable to fulfil their responsibilities, the government has no other recourse but to seek the assistance of the army: and the army has an obligation to assist the government whenever it is called upon to do so. Even so, the Constitution of India does not provide for martial law. Civilian political control – including in a national emergency – is supreme. And, the army is always employed in aid to civil authorities.

Resolution of internal armed conflict is a complex issue. Vexed Centre-state relations; a propensity to view conflict through the narrow prism of law and order; and external involvement can compound the problem. An inappropriate government response can further fuel discontent. It is for the union government to decide – based on sound professional advice – whether or not to commit the army to operations in aid to civil authorities for the maintenance of public order in internal armed conflict in a state. Thereafter, it is the responsibility of the union and state governments – despite their differences – to work in accord. Together, they must ensure conditions for the success of the campaign. They

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must invoke the necessary legal provisions; put in place arrangements that will ensure unity of effort; formulate and articulate a clear aim and comprehensive strategy; and demonstrate resolve in implementing the mutually agreed plan.

In internal armed conflict, the aim of the government is to isolate the dissident forces and gain the support of the people. It strives to achieve its goals through a combination of security; good governance; and political accommodation: the three pillars of the government's campaign.

The role of the army (and the security forces) is to neutralise the armed threat and assist the government in the restoration of normalcy. The army creates conditions in which the government can resolve conflict peacefully. It fulfils its role through the conduct of intelligence operations, defensive and offensive combat operations, population and resource control measures and military-civic action. Information is the key to gaining the support of the people and the media is the primary means of disseminating it.

Media in Sub-conventional Conflict

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Revolutionary technological developments – the cellular phone, the laptop, satellite communications and broadcast systems, and online services – ensure that the news is instant; it reaches a wide audience; it is graphic; and it has compelling emotional impact. Technology virtually precludes the ability to enforce any form of control, regulation and censorship on the media.²

Commerce - the saleability of the news, competition and ratings drive the media: being first – breaking news; being exclusive; and being able to attribute the news is important. Unfortunately, several other virtues of good reporting – accuracy and truthfulness; objectivity; verification; confirmation; corroboration; sensitivity and respect for privacy – are often sacrificed.

Speed of transmission, extent of reach and the effect of the news combine to endow the media with extraordinary power. Not only does the media report the news; it investigates it; it comments on it; and it expresses its opinion. It has the power to mould people's thinking and condition their responses. It can even influence decision-making and policy formulation in the government without

in anyway being responsible and accountable for its recommendations. James Adams terms it “power without responsibility.” He points out that the “line between reporting, commenting and policy-making is blurred” and that politicians, government servants and people pandering to the media has encouraged this development. Douglas Hurd warns that “war, peacekeeping and crisis management are not about consensus and opinion polls. They are about leadership and resolve where principle and conviction (must) override ill-informed media criticism.”³ In India,

decision-makers, particularly in government, need to demonstrate competence, confidence and courage to avoid being swayed by the media.

In sub-conventional conflict, the media, the dissident forces and the army (and the government) have a three-way relationship: the media seeks to report events; the dissident forces – through the media – seek publicity; and the army seeks to use the media to keep the people informed.

Paul Wilkinson describes the relationship between dissident forces and the media as symbiotic. Dissident forces provide the media with hot news that sells and the media provides dissident forces with its lifeblood – publicity. The public and the media are obsessed with violence; a single incident draws the media like a magnet; and the media feeds the insatiable public appetite for news of casualties, destruction and human tragedy – stories of weeping, wailing and breast beating. Walter Lacquer points out that the “terrorist act by itself is nothing; publicity is all.” He goes on to suggest that “publicity is the very goal of the terrorist act.” Publicity draws attention to the dissident forces and their cause; it provides the movement with recognition and legitimacy. It serves to manipulate the emotions of the people. Depending on how the media chooses to report an incident, it can induce extreme – even irrational – fear in individuals and communities; spread hysteria; and inflame passions. While reporting events live the media can be a distraction; assist dissident forces through the careless disclosure of information – particularly in hostage taking situations; interfere with, and jeopardise, the conduct of ongoing operations; and endanger the safety of the participants and, indeed, its own safety. Publicity can evoke political and public reactions that can hamper investigation and follow-up action. Public reactions can put intense pressure

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on, and often coerce, irresolute governments into conceding inappropriate demands.

In sub-conventional conflict, the media can become easy prey to dissident disinformation and propaganda. This is particularly true of the regional media wherein several factors – ethnicity, belief, sympathy, fear and financial inducements – can combine to subvert it. While this attitude may well alter as the security forces gain the ascendancy, a hostile media invariably serves as the mouthpiece of the dissident forces. Unless it makes a conscious and deliberate effort, the media can inadvertently end up partnering dissident forces.

Likewise, the media is the prime medium through which the army seeks to inform, educate, caution and advise the people about its activities in the campaign. At governmental level, it can often provide a suitable platform for purposeful discussions on the problem and its possible solutions. Informed debate helps mould people's thinking and builds support, but this is only possible if the government is unafraid and is encouraging of discourse on critical strategic issues. In sub-conventional conflict, the media also performs a vital watch-dog function – it ensures that state power is not misused; that human rights are not violated; that the laws of the land are upheld; and that justice is not only done but also seen to be done.

In India, the media – particularly the electronic media – revels in its power. It can be impatient, intrusive, insensitive, frivolous, and irresponsible. It is in danger of both trivialising the news and succumbing to sensationalism.⁴ And yet, it performs the onerous task of keeping – as Thomas Jefferson once said – “an eye on the government and military” and defending “democratic principles” admirably.

In sub-conventional conflict in India, the media has every right to understand, appreciate even empathise with the causes of conflict but, under no circumstances, can it allow itself to justify the means. It has an obligation to report the news but it has an equal responsibility to minimise harm and avoid the spread of alarm and panic amongst the people. It has a responsibility to deny dissident forces the publicity they crave. The media has a duty to hold the government and its forces to account but it must realise that while the law may be harsh – even draconian – the army is only doing its duty as long as it abides by the law.

The challenge before the government and the media is to ensure honest reporting without allowing the media to be manipulated into supporting the dissident forces.⁵ Given the freedom of the Press in India and the evil of any form

of censorship, the only option is for the media itself to demonstrate a sense of responsibility, self-control and self-regulation — perhaps, the voluntary adoption of a code of ethics. As Randall Bowdich says, “It is the media and not the terrorists who have the final say on what makes the news.”⁶

Public Relations – The Current Approach

Army Rule 21 and Defence Service Regulations (Regulations for the Army), paragraph 322 stipulate the guidelines for public relations and interaction between the media and the army. The guidelines ensure that no information on a Service subject is communicated to the media without the prior sanction of the Government of India. Even articles on subjects as innocuous as sports, arts and culture require the approval of a superior officer before publication.

In 1981, the army took the initiative to rationalise policy through an act of self-legislation contained in Special Army Order 15/S/81. Unfortunately, the effort came to nought with the issue in 2001 of yet another Special Army Order 3/S/2001/MI which timidly reiterated the provisions of the previous rules and regulations on the subject.

The focus of the army’s current media policy is public relations. Its primary concern is the projection of a positive image: to ensure that the army does not generate ill-will; that it is not discredited; that it does not appear in poor light; and that it does not cause any embarrassment to the Service. Not surprisingly, the army spends a disproportionate amount of its time and effort in damage control and the management of negative reporting. Rules, regulations and policies restrict interaction with the media to senior ranks – in no case below the rank of brigadier – and in every case only with the approval of an officer not below the level of a corps commander, and with a public relations officer of the Ministry of Defence present. Papers, statements and answers to anticipatory questions are all required to be submitted for prior approval and no deviation is permitted during interviews.

In principle, the army may interact with the media only through public relations officers of the Directorate of Public Relations, Ministry of Defence who may or may not be officers of the Defence Services. In addition to the public

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relations officer (army) at Army Headquarters, regional defence public relations officers are deployed throughout the country in some 24 select locations. They act as media advisers to local formation commanders. While they are co-located with military formation headquarters, they are not part of such headquarters. Their chain of command is distinct: they remain responsible to the director, Public Relations, Directorate of Public Relations, Ministry of Defence, who is a civilian officer of the Indian Information Service. Responsibility for oversight of the functions of the directorate rests with the Ministry of Defence and the Public Information Officer of the Government of India. As a consequence, cooperation and coordination between public relations officers and formation headquarters are predicated on effective communications, liaison and good personal relations. In practice, this arrangement subjects public relations officers to awkward dual control. Defence public relations officers are relatively junior in rank and status; their selection is seldom accorded the importance it deserves. Their professional background and comprehension of matters military and of conflict situations is deficient. They lack aptitude, communicating skills and motivation; and their preparation and training leaves a great deal of room for improvement. At least one sub-conventional conflict ridden area – the state of Tripura – is bereft of dedicated defence public relations officer cover.⁷

Currently, Government of India defence public relations organisations, rules, regulations, policies and procedures suggest an overwhelming desire on the part of the Ministry of Defence to retain control over the dissemination of information by the army. It betrays a lack of confidence and trust in the professional judgement and competence of the army. The result is a defensive, under-confident, laggard and reactive approach to public relations and interaction with the media.

In sum, the Defence Public Relations Organisation and its rules and regulations as they exist are archaic: they are in urgent need of overhaul. Inadequacies in the existing organisation and its functioning have repeatedly surfaced in sub-conventional conflict situations in the country. Further, during the Indo-Pakistan conflict in Kargil, 1999 glaring deficiencies were once again highlighted: the Defence Public Relations Organisation was simply unable to cope with the task.⁸ It compelled Army Headquarters to innovate and assume direct responsibility for its public relations campaign. Army Headquarters was quick to establish the Army Liaison Cell which has now evolved into an Additional Directorate General of Public Information in the Directorate of Military Intelligence, Army Headquarters. Subsequently, in 2003, permission was accorded for the establishment of a futuristic General

Staff (Information Warfare) Branch in Headquarters Northern Command and the headquarters of its 15 and 16 Corps. The branch combines several information warfare related staff functions to include public information and interaction with the media.

These measures constitute small, tentative but significant steps. It signals a deliberate shift in focus from public relations to public information. And, it recognises and acknowledges the fact that the army should be responsible for its own public information, particularly in sub-conventional conflict. Nevertheless, the fledgling organisations suffer from several shortcomings. First, there is a need for conceptual clarity. Public information is but one component of information warfare. As the title suggests, its purpose is to disseminate information of the army's efforts in the field to the people – the object of the campaign. It is distinct from the military intelligence function – the acquisition, collation and dissemination of intelligence of the adversary. Unlike propaganda, it is based entirely on truth. The public information staff branch is dependent on the intimate information support of the other branches in a headquarters in order to fulfil its functions. Second, the army public information organisation overlaps the functions of the existing defence public relations organisation: it results in turf battles which have the potential to undermine each other's functioning. Third, the organisation is ad-hoc; and the selection of personnel, their preparation, training and career management calls for much greater attention.

In the absence of a comprehensive, cohesive and coherent central government, state government and army approach to public information in sub-conventional conflict, the army often ploughs a lone furrow. Army field formations invariably combine aspects of public information, propaganda, counter-propaganda and psychological operations and take upon themselves the task of simultaneously addressing the various distinct target audiences in the conflict—the external source of support to the dissident forces, the dissidents themselves and the people—in their areas of operational responsibility. They assume responsibilities for which they are not adequately staffed, equipped or trained. The overall effort, commendable for its enthusiasm and enterprise, is often personality driven, spasmodic, amateur, lacking in resources and support, and unprofessional.

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The media and the profession of arms display several similar characteristics – idealism, professionalism, commitment and pride – and yet there are stark differences.⁹ The media is individualistic, liberal, non-conformist and seemingly,

always in a tearing hurry. The army, on the other hand, is hierarchical, loyal to the organisation, conservative and deliberate.¹⁰

According to the Press Council of India the media in sub-conventional conflict, “has an adversarial role”; “it questions authority” and establishes “a relationship of creative tension” necessary in a democratic society.¹¹ The army, on the other hand – not unreasonably – expects the media to support the government in the national endeavour to combat dissident forces that pose a threat to the security of the state: it wants to believe that the two are on the same side. The army sees the media, according to Gen BC Joshi, as a force multiplier.¹² Stephen Badsey clarifies that while “relations (between the army and the media) should be adversarial they do not have to be antagonistic.”¹⁴ The scepticism that invariably characterises the media’s approach towards the army in sub-conventional conflict does not necessarily constitute hostility.

The army tends to use terms such as exploit, manage, deal with and handle the media to describe army-media relations. Such terms hint at control over the media; it militates against the concept of independence of the media; and it threatens its credibility. It is for similar reasons that the media, understandably, balks at attempts by the army to use it for disinformation and propaganda⁹.

The media believes that the army lacks accessibility and responsiveness; that it is not technologically savvy; and that it does not understand the importance of timely information and the media’s compelling need to adhere to deadlines. It feels that the army’s concerns of confidentiality are exaggerated and propelled more by the need to avoid embarrassment to the organisation and its leadership than the actual need for security of information.¹⁵ It perceives the army as being overly conscious of its image and exceedingly sensitive to criticism.

The army does not understand that it is the media’s prerogative to repackage the news: it takes exception to the media changing the script. The army finds the poor knowledge and understanding of matters military; the reluctance to verify, confirm and corroborate information; the inaccuracy of reports; and the insensitivity and lack of respect for privacy particularly galling. It wants the media to maintain a sense of proportion and balance in its reporting.

Clearly, the media and the army must learn to understand and appreciate each other’s constraints, ethos and methods to be able to work around their differences and improve army-media relations to mutual advantage¹⁶. The requirement is for appropriate machinery and mechanisms for army-media interaction; for joint education and training of the army public information

staffs and the members of the media; and for the voluntary adoption of self-regulatory guidelines for the media.

Public Information – The Way Ahead

In sub-conventional conflict, the army and the media lean on each other: the army needs the support of the media more than ever before. The onus lies on the army to find ways and means of enhancing their relationship and making it more meaningful without trampling on the sensibilities of the media.

In October 1994, a report of the Press Council of India, Committee on Defence Coverage, underscored – amongst several other recommendations – the importance of the people's support for the national cause; acknowledged the role of the media in mediating between the armed forces and the people; recognised the need for strengthening the public relations organisation in the union government, in the state government and in the armed forces (army); and demanded a revamp of information and publicity in low intensity conflict (sub-conventional conflict).¹⁷

An overhaul of the government's defence related information and publicity mechanism is only possible if two things happen: (a) the delegation of authority and responsibility for the dissemination of information about the army, to the army; and (b) a detailed review of the existing rules, regulations, policies and instructions to formulate appropriate and realistic guidelines.¹⁸

The army organisation for information and publicity should be independent of, but linked to, the Public Relations Organisation of the Ministry of Defence. This will demand clarity in thinking, openness, jointness but most importantly it will call for the ministry's trust and confidence in the Service. It will require resources, time and effort.¹⁹ In the interim, the government should make the army directly responsible for all information and publicity in respect of its own activities in sub-conventional conflict.

In sub-conventional conflict, public information – as distinct from public relations – is the key. The aim is to gain the people's support for the government. The target audience is the public. Public information is based on the fundamental principle of truth. Whereas disinformation may well provide short-term

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advantages, in the long run it is bound to adversely affect the credibility, of the source and prove counter-productive. In sub-conventional conflict, the truth cannot be hidden.

Public information calls for a holistic approach: the army's effort is only one part of the government's overall public information campaign. The government must clearly delineate responsibilities for public information between the union government, the state government and the army in the field; each must target different sections of the audience in the specific areas of their own expertise and yet they must integrate and function in consonance. At every level, suitable machinery and staffs must exist.

Firstly, the army must begin by according its public information command and staff functions due importance and priority. Responsibility for army public information in sub-conventional conflict must rest with the highest military headquarters responsible for the conduct of military operations in a specific region: for example, in Tripura it would be Headquarters 21 Sector (Assam Rifles); in Nagaland, Headquarters IGAR (North); in Assam, Headquarters 4 Corps; and in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K), the headquarters of the three separate corps responsible for operations in the theatre. Army public information should primarily include information regarding the army's activities in the campaign – both operational and military civic action related – in its area of operational responsibility. The aim is to keep the people informed; create awareness; and gain their willing participation in, and support for, the army's endeavours. It is a vital part of the campaign to win hearts and minds. The media should serve as the primary means of providing information to the people and the regional media should be the focus of the army's attention.

Secondly, the General Staff Branch of the highest military headquarters should – in terms of staff and rank structure – have a tailor-made General Staff (Public Information) Section, which may well be part of a larger General Staff (Information Warfare) Branch.²⁰ Below the highest military headquarters in the region, dedicated army public information staff should be authorised at all intermediate headquarters down to the level of brigade headquarters (or equivalent). The existing regional defence public relations organisation should either be amalgamated with the army's revamped public information branch or be dispensed with to avoid duplication of effort and waste.

Thirdly, the public information staff at each headquarters should have the authority to interact directly with the media in their respective areas of

operational responsibility. The senior General Staff (Public Information) staff officer should be the spokesperson of the headquarters.

Fourthly, public information responsibilities between the highest military headquarters and intermediate headquarters must be clearly defined. The highest military headquarters should generally be responsible for the issue of background papers; press releases, rejoinders, rebuttals, assessments and estimates; the regular periodic release of collated data and information; and the preparation and release of periodic reports on military-civic action annual plans in the form of White Papers. It should establish an information centre for round the clock operations. It should also establish a standard web site on the internet for the expeditious, seamless and transparent transfer of information and data –

to the media – both on occurrence and periodically. As the army's technological ability improves, a video-feed capability should be developed. Where the army confronts a hostile regional media, serious consideration should be accorded to the in-house publication of a periodic information news sheet for free distribution to the public. It should be restricted to factual information – based on the absolute truth – which would be of particular interest to the people, and would help establish the credibility of the army. On the other hand, intermediate headquarters should have primary responsibility to furnish factual information and data to the media on all incidents that occur in their jurisdiction, immediately on occurrence. They should also be responsible to furnish information and data on the completion of individual military-civic action projects in their areas of operational responsibility. In operations involving several agencies, particularly in urban areas, the concept of establishing incident command posts must be adhered to and the authority to interact with the media at the site of an incident should be delegated to the senior most commander of the force that is playing the lead role at the site of the immediate incident.

Fifthly, the army must adopt an aggressive and transparent – nothing to hide – policy with regard to the dissemination of information pertaining to human rights violations and acts of military indiscipline in relation to civilians.²¹ Disciplinary proceedings of personnel on trial for having

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committed offences against civilians should routinely be conducted in open court with access being regulated only to ensure that the efficient conduct of the courts is not impeded. Consolidated information and data of results of investigations and trials should be made available to the media periodically with due care being taken not to jeopardise individual safety and security and the individual's right to privacy. These measures may be unpopular but without them, zero tolerance for human rights violations will remain mere rhetoric.

Sixthly, the selection, education, training, career profiling and career management of public information staffs must receive special attention. All officers on command and staff courses should be exposed to an introductory capsule on interaction with the media.²² Similarly, in sub-conventional conflict situations, formal interaction, exchange of ideas, education and training of army public information staffs and the media – particularly the local media – at periodic intervals under the aegis of the army would be of great mutual benefit.

Lastly, the following fundamental principles should govern army public information in sub-conventional conflict.

Truthful – public information must be based on the truth. Whereas it is not necessary always to disclose the whole truth, what is conveyed must always be the truth. There is no scope for disinformation in a public information campaign that is aimed at a domestic audience. Truth alone will ensure the credibility of the army. Where it is not possible or desirable to provide information or offer comment, there must be no hesitation in saying so.

Factual – public information must be factual. It must accurately convey the essentials – who, what, where and when – of an incident. Answers to the questions how and why; opinions, assessments and estimates should be left to the highest military headquarters responsible for the campaign.

Confidentiality – confidentiality of information must be ensured so as to not jeopardise the security of information and intelligence; the conduct of intelligence and combat operations; and the right to privacy of an individual. Public information should not result in the unwarranted disclosure of individual and unit identities.

Jurisdiction – public information must be restricted to events within the jurisdiction of the unit or formation as applicable.²³

Timely – the dissemination of public information must be timely and with due regard for media deadlines.

Accessibility – public information organisations and spokespersons must be accessible to the media at all times.

Proactive – public information policy should be proactive. The army should overload the media with information. The dissemination of information and data should be routine.

Delegation – responsibility to debrief the media on a specific incident should invariably be delegated to the military commander responsible for the incident on the spot.

Understatement – professionalism and deliberate understatement should be the hallmark of army public information: exaggeration and hyperbole must be scrupulously avoided. Self-praise should be sparing.

Conclusion

In sub-conventional conflict in India, the media is the prime medium through which the army seeks to keep the people informed; gain their understanding and support; and, thus, contribute to the success of the government's campaign. Whilst the media has every right to report the news with honesty and purpose, it has an equal responsibility – in a situation where the security of the state is threatened – to ensure that it does not support and encourage dissident forces, and spread despondency and alarm in society. Meaningful relations between the army and the media are essential and for that, the burden quite clearly lies on the army. The army needs to assume full responsibility for the conduct of its own information campaign. It needs to focus on public information as distinct from public relations; create suitable organisations staffed by competent personnel at every necessary level of command; and decentralise and delegate executive functions as appropriate. Simultaneously, it needs to take steps to facilitate mutual understanding and improve its interaction with the media.

Notes

1. The term army is used to denote the armed forces and/or the army as applicable throughout the paper. Similarly, the term dissident has been used to denote subversives, terrorists and insurgents.
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3. *Ibid.*, pp. 114-115.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 109.

5. Perl Raphael, "Terrorism, the Media, and the Government: Perspectives, Trends, and Options for Policymakers," Congressional Research Service.
6. Randall Bowdich, "Cerberus to Mind: Media as Sentinel in the Fight Against Terrorism," Strategic Insights, Vol V, Issue 5, May 2006.
7. AK Chakraborty and VC Natrajan, *Defence Reporting in India: The Communication Gap* (Noida: Trishul Publications, 1995), pp. 19-39.
8. Anil Bhat, *Information and Security: Where Truth Lies* (New Delhi: Manas Publications, 2008), p. 82.
10. SC Tyagi, "Citizenry, Media and Military," *Pinnacle – The ARTRAC Journal*, Vol. 2, No. 1. Shimla, March 2003. p. 85.
11. *Ibid.*, p. 161.
12. Chakraborty and Natrajan, *Defence Reporting in India*, preface.
13. *Ibid.*, pp. 1-2.
14. Stephen Badsey, "The Armed Forces, Society and Media," ESRC Programme, May 2002, Policy Papers, *The Armed Forces and Society in Post Communist Europe: Legitimacy & Change*.
15. Chakraborty and Natrajan, *Defence Reporting in India*, p. 141.
16. Bhat, *Information and Security: Where Truth Lies*, p. 158.
17. Dinesh Kumar, *Soldiers and Scribblers – Media in Information War: A Case Study of India*, IDSA, Occasional Papers Series, New Delhi, 2001, pp. 38-39.
18. Chakraborty and Natrajan, *Defence Reporting in India*, p. 154.
19. Tyagi, "Citizenry, Media and Military," p. 87.
20. *Ibid.*
21. Ashok Krishna, "Armed Forces and the Media," *IPCS*, Article No. 406, August 16, 2000.
22. Chakraborty and Natrajan, *Defence Reporting in India*, p. 147.
23. Tyagi, "Citizenry, Media and Military," p. 86.