

**Seminar Report**

**NATIONAL SECURITY AND  
MILITARY STRATEGY**

**February 21, 2018**



Centre for Land Warfare Studies  
New Delhi



KNOWLEDGE WORLD  
KW Publishers Pvt Ltd  
New Delhi

Seminar Co-ordinator: Col S P Das

Rapporteurs: Ameya Kelkar, Praggya Surana and Nikita Kohli



**Centre for Land Warfare Studies**

RPSO Complex, Parade Road, Delhi Cantt, New Delhi 110010

Phone: +91.11.25691308 Fax: +91.11.25692347

email: [landwarfare@gmail.com](mailto:landwarfare@gmail.com) • website: [www.claws.in](http://www.claws.in)

CLAWS Army No. 33098

The Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS), New Delhi, is an independent think tank dealing with contemporary issues of national security and sub-conventional conflicts and terrorism. CLAWS conducts research that is futuristic in outlook and policy-oriented in approach.

© 2018, Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS), New Delhi

All rights reserved

The views expressed in this report are sole responsibility of the speaker(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Government of India, or Integrated Headquarters of MoD (Army), or the Centre for Land Warfare Studies.

The content may be reproduced by giving due credited to the speaker(s) and the Centre for Land Warfare Studies, New Delhi.

Printed in India by



KNOWLEDGE WORLD

KW Publishers Pvt Ltd

4676/21, First Floor, Ansari Road, Daryaganj, New Delhi 110002

Phone: +91.11.23263498 / 43528107

email: [kw@kwpub.com](mailto:kw@kwpub.com) • website: [www.kwpub.com](http://www.kwpub.com)

# CONTENTS

Executive Summary	4
Detailed Report	8
Introduction	8
The Rise of China and Implications	8
US-China Strategic Competition and its Implications	8
Modernisation of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) Doctrine, Technological Innovations and Organisational Change	10
Indian Perspective on China	12
Future of Warfare	14
Future of Naval Warfare/Power	14
The Future of Land Warfare: An Indian Perspective	15
Promoting a Culture of Military Diplomacy & Trategic Studies	16
Flexibility in the Air Force/“Affordable Air Power”	16
Developing a Curriculum for a National Defence University: US Air War College	19
Culture of Military Diplomacy & Strategic Studies in India	22
Conclusion	25
Programme	26

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

- Post cold war, the United States emerged as the unipolar power in the world and it will continue to be the dominant power by virtue of its military supremacy, which is based on its control over the airspace, the high seas and a large presence in the outer space. In short to medium term, there is no serious competitor to the supremacy of the United States. Hence, in the near-to-mid term, there does not seem to be a shift in this dominance of the United States, however, the shift might be perceptible in the long run by China taking over these three main areas.
- The world must acknowledge that today's China has already risen and its endeavours towards transformation and modernisation of its military to meet the challenges of the new information age, has had a major impact on its strategic outlook. The international system is rapidly changing, leading to a system of complex multipolarity. On the economic front, there is interdependence between the United States and China, and China is the largest holder of US Treasury Bills (\$ 1166 Billion), as per the data released by the Department of the Treasury/Federal Reserve Board on September 18, 2107. The One Belt One Road initiative of China is extremely significant as it would be the key for global dominance by China. This aims to diminish the role and influence of the United States, globally.
- China is the largest trade partner for 124 countries in the world, whereas the United States is for only 56 countries. Not only the US but also most of its strategic allies are the major trading partners of China. The Chinese believe that they are now the true globalisers. The policy circles in the United States view this as the Chinese attempt in dismantling the US-led post-Second World War international economic order. Traditional allies of the United States such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Australia, and so forth, are incapable of operating in an anti-Chinese coalition and have really been non-starters.

- The major source of influence of the United States has not only been its strategic, military or economic power but also its soft power. While all countries admire China, no one really wants to be it or be with it. With the increasing focus of the United States towards the Middle East, it is largely estimated that the strategic focus of the United States towards China will decrease and rather, its economic cooperation with China will increase.
- In 2015, China defined its new military strategy, which saw a marked shift from ‘domestic defence’ to ‘safeguard China’s security and interests in the new domains’ and ‘to safeguard the security of China’s overseas interests’. To ensure these strategic interests, the Chinese would require—firstly, a blue water navy and secondly, a strategic air force. To achieve the aforesaid goals, the Chinese have developed a three-step process for the modernisation of their armed forces, which is built on the concepts of mechanisation and informatisation. China has also affected some major restructuring in the matters of defence like drastic changes in the command and control structure of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), having a more centralised as well as streamlined Central Military Commission (CMC) and the inclusion of Rocket Forces and Strategic Support Forces into the traditional structure of the army, navy and air force.
- While it is highly unlikely that the United States would enter into a direct military confrontation with the Chinese anytime soon, the possibilities of the containment of Chinese ambitions in the region also remain sceptical. It is considered that accommodation is the only possible action for the United States.
- Though adequate stress has been given to the rise of China in the political, economic and military domains, it must be balanced with the ground reality of domestic conditions in China that is, its authoritarian regime, legitimacy, corruption, repression and the interlinked sociopolitical and socio-economic issues. This can also be seen in the concerns raised by India and other countries in the region with regard to the geopolitical and geostrategic expansion of China, which narrates a completely different story than that of the ‘peaceful rise’ of China.

- China is operating actively in the Indian Ocean and resorting to power projection in this region. It has participated in anti-piracy operations, has set up a base in Djibouti and its submarines are making port visits. Chinese economic interest is deepening around the world. The Chinese nuclear policy hinges on use to protect its own interests. With growing overseas interests, the Chinese concept of ‘protecting its own interests’ needs to be questioned.
- As regards future warfare, the large-pitched conventional defence has become less important in today’s environment of information and asymmetric warfare. From the Indian perspective, the likely shaping actors for the future land warfare are—the United States, China and Pakistan. And the important shaping factors would be—nuclear weapons, information warfare, artificial intelligence, space warfare and autonomous weapon systems, projectile-centric strategy including precision-guided munitions and dynamics of hybrid warfare.
- It is felt that China’s assertiveness in the southern and south-eastern region will increase further. Its recent adventures under the One Belt One Road initiative have resulted in the encirclement of India and some of these developments are in the disputed areas or are very close to the Indian land borders. China has sorted out its borders with 14 nations; however, it follows a different approach towards India. It has emerged that it has no will to settle the border dispute with India and wants to retain the unsettled border as a future bargaining chip.
- For developing the curriculum for the National Defence University, following were recommended:
  - Know what you want out of a National Defence curriculum and pursue it deliberately.
  - Start the process earlier. Lt Cols and Cols are too late in the process to become strategic thinkers.
  - All students to see the complexity of the world. No simple answer, only complex problems.

- As far as military diplomacy and strategic studies are concerned, it is considered as a tool to facilitate diplomacy and is associated with conflict prevention. India started off being ideological (anti-apartheid), further moved on towards establishing training teams in the neighbouring countries and the east coast of Africa. It reached out to Central Asia post-Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and has played a stellar role in the United Nations (UN) peacekeeping missions and is seen as a net provider of security worldwide. India has had a multitude of strategic cultures, which were drawn from many ancient texts, such as Chanakya's *Arthashastra* and promotes the idea of many India(s), each with its distinctive military strategies.
- The suggested steps for the way ahead for India with regard to military diplomacy and strategic studies are enumerated below:
  - Maintain a demand-and-supply equilibrium—demand for training courses, with a certain percentage to be shared with the international students.
  - Optimise our internal resources.
  - Deal with the issues of the 21st century.
  - Elaborate on our own strategic culture and thoughts and build upon it.
  - Look at the developments around and determine our own strategic doctrine.
  - Put strategic issues in the public domain to foster a wide spectrum of dialogues and assist the security forces in being a force which can achieve India's national aims.

# DETAILED REPORT

## *Introduction*

During the past few decades, China has grown as an economic superpower and also as a strategic fulcrum of the world and therefore, its role and influence in the present global scenario needs to be closely examined. Considering the strategic developments in the region, it has become important for the scholars to debate ‘the rising China’ and develop new ways of looking at China. The world must acknowledge that today’s China has already risen and is here for what it wants. Its endeavours towards complete transformation and modernisation of its military to meet the challenges of the new information age, has had a major impact on its strategic outlook and the world’s perceptions towards it.

## *The Rise of China and Implications*

### **US-China Strategic Competition and its Implications**

As regards US–China strategic competition and its implications, it is highlighted that post cold war, the United States had emerged as a unipolar power in the world and has had military supremacy since then. This military supremacy has been based on its control over the airspace over 15,000 feet, command of the high seas and a large presence in the outer space. It has divided the world into various combat commands. It has a well-trained, professional and innovative military. In short to medium term, there is no serious competitor to the supremacy of the United States. Hence, in the near to mid term, there does not seem to be a shift in this dominance of the United States, however, the shift might be perceptible in the long run by China taking over these three main areas. As we see in the present scenario, the international system is rapidly changing, leading to the development of a system of complex multipolarity. It is considered by the experts that China’s influence decreases steadily as one moves away from its borders. Therefore,

China is using the power of globalisation to enhance its influence in the world and thus, trying to create an alternative global economic system. This practice has been followed by China for the last couple of decades or so.

On the economic front, there is a lot of interdependence between US and China. China is the largest holder of US Treasury Bills (\$ 1166 Billion), as per the data released by the Department of the Treasury/ Federal Reserve Board on September 18, 2107. As regards the One Belt One Road initiative of China, it is argued by the experts that this step by China is extremely significant since it would be the key for global dominance by China. It is felt that not only will this be a trade route but also will include the laying of fibre-optic, telephone cable and everything else that goes with it, while at the same time diminishing the role and influence of the United States. As regards major trading partners, it has emerged that there are 124 countries in the world for which China is the largest trade partner, whereas United States is the largest trade partner for only 56 countries (source—*Parag Khanna*, #Connectography, June 2016). It is significant to note that the top 10 trading partners of China are—European Union, United States, Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Hong Kong, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Australia, Russia and Brazil. It indicates that not only the United States but also most of its strategic allies are the major trading partners of China. Moreover, quoting the speech delivered by Xi Jinping at the UN in Geneva in January 2017, which states ...“In the coming 5 years, China will import \$8 trillion worth of goods, attract \$600 billion worth of foreign investment, make \$750 billion of outbound investment and Chinese tourists will make 700 million outbound visits. All this will bring more development opportunities to other countries”. This clearly shows the Chinese belief that they are now the true globalisers.

Consequent to this, the policy circles in the United States are now showing great concerns as they view this as the Chinese attempt in dismantling the US-led post Second World War international economic order. The Chinese now want greater share of the US ‘strategic jewels’, such as Microsoft, Boeing, Google, and so forth. Traditional allies of the United States such as the NATO, Australia, and so forth are incapable

of operating in an anti-Chinese coalition and have really been non-starters. Further, the US' decision to walk out of major international trade deals, such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), leaves China as the driver of Asian economic development.

However, it is argued that all is not lost for the United States. The major source of influence of the United States has not only been its strategic, military or economic power, but also its soft power. A look at the rankings of the 'National Brands Index—2016' indicates that while the United States has retained its number one position, all the top 10 countries shown in this index are liberal democracies. It is often said by the experts that while all countries admire China, no one really wants to be it or be with it. A closer look at the top 20 global universities reveals that there is no Chinese university in this list. Moreover, the United States draws lot of power from the global influence of some of its major corporations like Google, Apple, Facebook, Amazon, Microsoft, and so forth.

As far as US-China relations in the current era are concerned, the United States presently sees three strategic concerns—as it needs to deal with Russia, Middle East and China. However, it can realistically tackle only one out of the three. With the increasing focus of the United States towards the Middle East, it is largely estimated that the US strategic focus towards China will decrease and rather, its economic cooperation with China will increase. Towards the end, it is brought out that we must now stop looking at—either 'rising China' or hoping that it would fail somehow—because China has already risen and if it has not fallen or defaulted in the past 20 years, it is not likely to happen now or anytime soon. India must learn its lessons and must increase its engagements with China in the larger national interest and try to balance its regional as well as global influence in the future.

### **Modernisation of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) and People's Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) Doctrine, Technological Innovations and Organisational Change**

As far as modernisation of the PLA and the PLAAF and its implications are concerned, it is emphasised that we need to focus on strategy. Strategy, however, is not simply about the manoeuvres

by a singular actor, but is rather based on knowledge and a keen understanding of the adversary. While looking at the Chinese Air Force (PLAAF), we must therefore, begin with the understanding that it is entirely dominated by the Chinese Army (PLA). However, in the recent times, there have been major changes in the organisation of the Chinese forces.

Though the world has been focusing on the weapon systems being developed by the Chinese military, they tend to neglect the more important development that is the development of a new war-fighting system by China. In the 2015 paper, wherein, China's new military strategy was defined, there is a marked shift from domestic defence to a new focus on 'safeguard China's security and interests in new domains' and 'to safeguard the security of China's overseas interests'. To ensure these strategic interests, they would thus require—first, a blue water navy and second, a strategic air force. Development of such a new system of active defence would be focused on a few scenarios to include war against Taiwan (with foreign intervention), small to medium-scale wars with India and others over border and sea issues, a low-intensity counterterror operation in Xinjiang and most importantly, be prepared for an all out war for superpower status (focus on the United States). It is this new systemic development that needs focused attention from India and the world.

To achieve the aforesaid goals, the Chinese have developed a three-step process for the modernisation of their armed forces, which is built on the concepts of mechanisation and informatisation. This refers to having more tanks and motorised vehicles to replace the foot soldiers, which would be backed by a network-centric warfare strategy. What is most impressive is that the Chinese have made steady progress towards these goals and in a better time frame than what they had envisioned. It would not be long before they accomplish their goal of modernisation of the national defence and armed forces by the mid-21st century. This has further influenced some drastic changes in the command and control structure of the PLA, with a more centralised as well as streamlined CMC and the inclusion of two more military wings of Rocket Forces and Strategic Support Forces to the traditional structure of the army, navy, and air force. This has been accompanied

by a massive force reduction and an increasing focus on having a more modern and streamlined force structure based on the understanding that in the future, China will require a more integrated and modern military, which can focus not only on safeguarding the mainland but also its overseas interests and bases.

In such a developing scenario, it would be interesting to see possible US actions/reactions to Chinese military activities, in its vicinity. However, in order to understand the extent to which the United States will engage with China in a military or non-military fashion over disputed territories, it is pertinent to carry out a deep analysis of the US strategic objectives in the Asia-Pacific. While it is highly unlikely that the United States would enter into a direct military confrontation with the Chinese anytime soon, the possibilities of containment of Chinese ambitions in the region also remain sceptical. It is considered that accommodation is the only possible action.

### **Indian Perspective on China**

As regards Indian perspective on China, adequate stress has been given to the continued importance of China and its rise in the political, economic and military domains, which has been exemplified by the use of various expressions such as ‘Rise of China’, ‘China Effect’, ‘China Century’, ‘Peaceful Rise’, and so forth. However, it is argued that the most important motto remains that of ‘Peaceful Rise’ and ‘China’s Peaceful Development’. This has been so because these are the official policy statements of the government of the People’s Republic of China and consequently, are a reflection or projection of what they wish the rest of the world to see them as. However, these ideas and proclamations must be balanced with the ground reality of the domestic conditions in China to include its authoritarian regime, its legitimacy, corruption, repression and the interlinked sociopolitical and socio-economic issues, which continue to plague the law and order situation in the country. This can also be seen in the concerns raised by India and other countries in the region with regard to the geopolitical and geostrategic expansion of China, which to them narrates a completely different story than that of the ‘Peaceful Rise’ that the Chinese have been wanting them to hear.

Against this backdrop, it is argued that there are three discernible ways that China has been dealing with the world, which have consequently become China's claim to legitimacy when faced with critical issues. The first is that of unequal treaties and China has been citing them for most of their territorial disputes. This is visible in the selective use of historical treaties and agreements by China in defence of its new and imagined territorial borders. The second is the concept of nationalism and the third is that of sovereignty. These concepts have been successfully used by China to craft a very strong Chinese national identity among the people and can be seen as a conscious and full-scale rewriting of China's history and foreign policy goals, objectives and methods. Consequently, we are seeing the emergence of a new China, which is expansionist, revisionist and combatant, be it with the Philippines with respect to the Scarborough Shoal and the Senkaku islands or be it with India when it comes to Doklam and managing the Indian Ocean region, and so on. China has been selectively using history in support of its revisionist claims. Hence, there is a need for keeping a check on the growing appetite of the geostrategic interests of China by the countries in the region and those with interest, such as the G7.

The aim of any strategy is to be able to influence the perceptions and the decision-making capabilities of the adversary. This is exactly what the Chinese are trying to do with the One Belt One Road initiative and closer to home, with the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). It is considered that India too would be deeply affected by such developments owing to the presence of active Chinese defence in the region via CPEC. Further, India is also likely to be affected by the recent Chinese activities like the takeover of the Hambantota port, establishment of a new overseas base in Djibouti and recent Chinese interventions in Bhutan and Maldives. The purported peaceful rise of China stands in stark contrast to the endless status quo revisionism in almost all its existing territorial disputes, in its efforts to become the 'middle kingdom' geographically, economically and politically. It is argued by experts that the future of Asia will be shaped by the collective social amnesia towards China's expansionism, in lieu of gaining its economic advantages, which would finally lead to the fast-approaching era of China-centric Asia.

## *FUTURE OF WARFARE*

### **Future of Naval Warfare/Power**

The US Navy has not really fought a naval war since the Second World War. USSR was a competitor but since the collapse of USSR, there has been no power which has even been able to challenge the US Navy. There were incidents like the Cuban Missile crisis but since the Second World War, operations have largely been power projection through aircraft carriers or interdiction.

The Indian Ocean has traditionally been a transit area and not an operational area for the US Navy. However, this is going to change in the future. China has already started operating actively in the Indian Ocean. It has participated in anti-piracy operations, has set up a base in Djibouti and Chinese submarines are making port visits. Therefore, the Indian Ocean becomes relevant in the current situation. The One Belt One Road policy is similar to the erstwhile Russian policy of building ports. The aim might not be ownership of the ports, but the Chinese would be satisfied with operating out of these ports and replenishing there.

The Chinese Navy is the second largest owner of naval landmines. This makes sense given their focus on Taiwan, but what will it mean for the future? China is striving to be a world power. They cannot probably do it today but they are making significant progress in this direction. Chinese economic interest is deepening around the world for example, in Pakistan and South Africa. There is a simultaneous rise of Chinese influence. The Chinese do not trust United States and India to protect their overseas interests. The Chinese nuclear policy hinges on use to protect its own interests. With growing overseas interests, the Chinese concept of 'protecting its own interests' needs to be questioned.

China has also declared itself as an Arctic power. It has thrown its hat in the ring with increasing commercial interests in the Arctic. This move has made an impact on the nations territorially in the Arctic. Further, China has made technological leaps in the construction of aircraft carriers, which can be effectively used in the Indian Ocean.

China is constantly making efforts towards power projection in the Indian Ocean region, which is in line with its long-term strategy.

As regards future naval warfare, it is felt that despite the technological advances, old school technology like patrol assets and minesweepers will remain essential. There is a need to focus on joint operations and develop capabilities together. It is vital to work in tandem. Though there has been some progress in this regard in the recent past, we need to move further and build more confidence during peacetime so that we can rely on it during war.

### **The Future of Land Warfare: An Indian Perspective**

The new technologies are in favour of offence instead of defence. Large-pitched conventional defence has been rendered useless in today's environment of information and asymmetric warfare. From the Indian perspective, the likely shaping actors for the future land warfare are—the United States, China and Pakistan. And the important shaping factors would be—nuclear weapons, information warfare, artificial intelligence, space warfare and autonomous weapon systems, projectile-centric strategy, including precision-guided munitions and dynamics of hybrid warfare.

As far as Indo-Pak relation is concerned, Pakistan has been historically propagating the anti-India agenda. Pakistan deeply suffers from identity crisis and it has been teaching its future generations that their geography would have been very different, had it not been for India. There are multiple competing identities for Pakistan—the anti-West rhetoric, the strong anti-India feelings, the Islamic, subregional and sectarian identities, pro-terrorism sentiments for Jammu and Kashmir which create an identity conflict for Pakistan. It is a well known fact that Pakistan is abetting a proxy war in the state of Jammu and Kashmir in India.

As regards China, it is felt that China's assertiveness in the southern and south-eastern region is ever increasing. Its recent adventures under the One Belt One Road initiative have resulted in the encirclement of India, for example, establishment of a naval base at Gwadar, possible naval bases at Marao and Djibouti, a possible container port at Chittagong

and surveillance facilities at Zadetkyi Kyun and Coco Islands. Some of these developments are in the disputed areas or are very close to the Indian land borders.

China has sorted out borders with 14 nations, however, it follows a different approach with India. There are differing perceptions between China and India regarding border disputes and approach to their resolutions. It is seen that a new area is disputed almost every year by China and it wants to probably maintain the strategic leverage over India. It has perhaps no will to settle the border dispute with India and wants to retain the unsettled border as a future bargaining chip, which has resulted in a continued overhang of ‘threat subtext’ in India. Moreover, China consistently perpetuates parity between India and Pakistan, which is not liked by India.

There are new technologies like microwave weaponry and directed energy weapons which have serious hard and soft kill functions. China’s heavy investment in such technologies leaves us vulnerable. Information warfare is also a field in which it has made progress. Science has moved towards independence of weapons and the armed forces should not be left behind. Artificial intelligence, big data are the trump card weaponry of the future. The next war is likely to include a massive cyberattack which will paralyze civilian and military capabilities. The boundaries between war and peace are already blurred and it would bode well to prepare for the hybrid war of the future.

### ***PROMOTING A CULTURE OF MILITARY DIPLOMACY & STRATEGIC STUDIES***

#### **Flexibility in the Air Force/“Affordable Air Power”**

The future of warfare is going to be hybrid warfare. Hybrid warfare leads to participants learning on the job in a quick manner for example, in Iraq, the US Navy had the largest number of electronic warfare officers, who were put on land to locate improvised explosive devices (IEDs). US Navy had the largest number of casualties in Iraq, more than the US Air Force.

- The future of air power is envisaged as under:
  - In future, air power will not be restricted to the air forces of the world. Changes in the last 20 years have made air power more of a broad-based need than one only for the air force.
  - There will be a blurring of civil and military lines, for example, US Border Patrol and immigration officers to get better equipment, including drones, and so forth, for their surveillance operations as part of Donald Trump's proposed border wall.
  - Blurring of civil and military lines is also seen as the United States currently has six air forces, with five being placed under the military. The sixth being the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and its drones.
  - The US model of air power is too expensive.
  - It is going to be network-centric warfare.
  - Cyber command.
  - Space command.
- To meet future requirements, the United States needs a \$733 billion defence budget, which is not achievable.
  - Rich countries are no longer developing air power as it has become very expensive, instead they are taking shortcuts to maintain their air power, for example, Canada declined to purchase first-hand F-35s and instead went to the Australians and offered to buy the F-18s they were not using. Europeans are also cutting their costs of F-35s to go for cheaper European models like Rafale, and so forth.
  - Many countries do not want to acquire the fifth generation aircraft as it is very expensive. They are instead going for more affordable aircrafts.
- The nature of future missions is changing:
  - The biggest challenge for the Italian Air Force is illegal

immigration across the Mediterranean. Italian Navy wanted submarines to tackle this problem, however, the Air Force stated that it would be better if reconnaissance aircrafts were purchased. The Italian parliament went with the Air Force's suggestions.

- Nature of recruitment in air forces is changing from 'action in the front lines' to 'contributing to the humanitarian efforts in Congo'.
- Brazilians bought a couple of squadrons of Gripen aircraft, while their biggest problem is of poaching in their forests, which led to the need for long-range unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) over the Gripen.
- What is relevant in the 21st century.
  - **Plug and play kind of equipment/system.** Coalition is taking precedence, which requires systems to be able to work across a whole range of different air forces engaged in military operations.
  - **Use of drones.** What a drone can do in terms of reconnaissance and strike operations is something a tactical fighter aircraft cannot do.
  - **Personnel.** It is important to keep up the morale of the forces, which is also useful for meeting unforeseeable threats.
- Affordable Indian Air Force (IAF). The following are suggested.
  - **Too much of bureaucracy.** It has taken almost 20 years for the Ministry of Defence (MoD) to provide the Hawk aircraft to the Indian Armed Forces, and meanwhile the price of the Hawk has also doubled. Similarly, bureaucratic hurdles envisaged the Rafale deal too.
  - **Need for 42 squadrons.** It is argued that India should have more number of Sukhoi aircrafts to complete the overall requirement of 42 squadrons, as they are much cheaper and indigenously manufactured.

- **Gripen vs F-16.** Mass production or licensed production of F-16s will result in them making their way to the Pakistan Air Force. Therefore, it was suggested to buy the Gripen.
- **Get more of the indigenously-built Tejas aircrafts in the IAF.** It can be termed as an advanced attack trainer, which can be exported to other countries, thus fulfilling the make in India project and will also lead to the modernisation of the IAF.
- **Army air power.** The Indian army needs reconnaissance and tactical drones, if they are to meet the conditions for hybrid warfare.

### **Developing a Curriculum for a National Defence University: US Air War College**

- **Mission of the US Air War College.** Educate the senior military and civilian teammates to serve as critical and strategic thinkers, who are able to serve as national security senior leaders.
- **Vision of the US Air War College.** To be the foremost college for air, space and cyberspace education and thought-preparing the world's best joint senior leaders.
- **What is the Air War College?**
  - A liberal arts college using a seminar-based discussion format with civilians, academics and military instructors, who use the Socratic method to create strategic thinkers out of the students.
- **Definition of a strategist.** Someone who can explain complex ideas and have a vision for how to implement these ideas in complex, real-life situations.
- A strategic leader/thinker formulates a decision on how to react to a situation based on the generation of these ideas. It begins with understanding the subject they are working with and the adversary they are operating against.
- The US Air War College is divided into three departments.

## 20 NATIONAL SECURITY AND MILITARY STRATEGY

- Department of war fighting—consisting mainly of the military faculty.
- Department of strategy.
- Department of international security studies.
- Has about 250 students and 48 international fellows (one always coming from India) every year.
- It conducts about 16 seminars in a year, with each seminar consisting of air force officers, army officers (both domestic and international), civilians and marine officers.
  - It promotes an atmosphere of critical thinking and brings in diverse views, leading to the generation of dialogues and discussions among all the participants.
- The faculty members present opposing ideas during the seminars to help generate more deep thinking and rational approach.
- The aim is not to create consensus during discussions, instead the focus is towards ‘making the waters muddy’, thereby, showcasing the complexity of the world they live in. It also fosters the idea that there is never only one right answer.
- Curriculum of the ten months course (Academic year (AY) 18 Resident Program Calendar) conducted by the US War College.
  - Academic preparation.
  - Study of foundations of strategy (introduce international relation’s concepts and theories) and strategic leadership and profession of arms.
  - National security decision-making—to oversee all the inputs that go into making national security decisions. It is a fluid course wherein every lecturer adds his own dimensions to it like discussion on decolonisation, American foreign policy, and so forth.
  - Regional and cultural studies—looking at the world from a regional perspective. Fosters dialogue between partners and allies.

- Global security study.
- Commandant's lecture series—senior military leaders are invited to talk about their practices and experiences (both positive and negative).
- Grand strategy seminar—it is a self-selective seminar which looks at the bigger strategic challenges faced by the United States at present as well as in the future.
- Challenges being faced by the US Air War College:
  - Technical-minded officers (mainly the air force) leading to a background of the narrow leadership environment.
  - Constraints on teaching faculty—to ensure a product-based learning environment and come out of the need of the military to see immediate results.
  - Many masters—faculty works under many superiors and it has to meet various expectations, thus making it difficult to have an effective curriculum.
  - The strength of students in the War college is approximately 250 officers. However, only a handful of them become general officers in their respective militaries. It leads the faculty to question whether to focus on all 250 officers or the select handful.
  - Higher age of students—most officers come in the rank of Lt Cols or Cols, thus making it difficult to change their line of thinking in a short span of time.
- Developing a curriculum for a National Defence University. To develop the curriculum for a National Defence University, following are recommended:
  - Know what you want out of a National Defence Curriculum and pursue it deliberately.
  - Start the process earlier. Lt Cols and Cols are too late in the process to become strategic thinkers.

## 2.2 NATIONAL SECURITY AND MILITARY STRATEGY

- All students to see the complexity of the world. No simple answer, only complex problems.

### Culture of Military Diplomacy & Strategic Studies in India

- Military diplomacy is looked at as a tool to facilitate diplomacy. It is associated with conflict prevention.
- Military attaché—a part diplomat, part soldier and part scout. According to Lord Curzon, he is “not entirely welcome”.
- Duties and responsibilities of military attaché. He is responsible for various activities to include coordination of a high level defence-related visit, dialogue on security challenges, protocol, defence cooperation, training exchanges, source development and marketing of defence equipment.
- Indian heritage:
  - India inherited a large-scale army from the British on the eve of independence.
  - It started looking at training of officers abroad, high-level visits, humanitarian and disaster relief assistance.
- Staff College in India:
  - Started in 1950 with seven students.
  - Produced Chiefs in Sri Lanka, Malaysia, Australia and Kenya.
  - Three heads of state in Bhutan, Bangladesh and Ghana.
- India started off being ideological (anti-apartheid), further moved on towards establishing training teams in the neighbouring countries and the East Coast of Africa.
- It reached out to Central Asia post-USSR.
- India has played a stellar role in UN Peacekeeping Missions and is seen as a net provider of security worldwide.
- High availability disaster recovery (HADR)—in 2004, India was impacted with the tsunami and also assisted East Asia in the tsunami relief efforts.

- Role played by India in evacuating civilians (Indian and allied) from war-torn regions such as Libya, Lebanon and Yemen was much appreciated.
- Current status of military diplomacy and strategic studies in India:
  - Demand for various courses and activities.
  - India has to act commensurate to its interests along with its resources.
  - Active role being played by think tanks in military diplomacy.
  - Debate on realism versus idealism.
  - India believes in multilateralism, but focuses on bilateralism for its own needs and goals.
  - India does not believe in having military alliances and hence, does not have one with any country.
  - Domestic realities guide the prudence in foreign policy.
  - Headquarters Integrated Defence Staff (HQ IDS) has a system of contingency for HADR activities, keeping India ready for short-notice humanitarian deployments.
  - India seen as a reluctant power rooted in pragmatism.
- Way ahead for India:
  - Maintain a demand-and-supply equilibrium—demand for courses, with certain percentage to be shared with the international students.
  - Optimise our internal resources.
  - Deal with the issues of the 21st century.
  - Need to elaborate on our own strategic culture and thoughts and build upon it.
  - Look at the developments around and determine our own strategic doctrine.

- Put strategic issues in the public domain to foster a wide spectrum of dialogues and assist the security forces in being a force which can achieve India's national aims.
- India has had a multitude of strategic cultures.
  - Cultural strategic studies of India—is drawn from many ancient texts like Chanakya's *Arthashastra* and promotes the idea of many India(s), each with its distinctive military strategies.
  - Indian strategic studies are in consonance with the collective memory of the people along with the past war-time experiences of the country.
  - Chanakya's *Arthashastra*—looks at statecraft and refers to governance, law, diplomacy, foreign policy and so forth, while being grounded in reality (secular, pluralist and has a moral component to it). It also recognises the need for military strength without the militarization of society, state or foreign policy.
  - Buddhist and Jain philosophies also found their way into the Indian strategy. Buddhist philosophy focused on the 'realpolitik', while Jain philosophy focused on the idea of non-violence.
  - Ancient India had trade relationships with South East Asian countries along with the Middle East.
  - Rajputana culture was heavily military-oriented. Sikh adoption of a military culture also shows how the peaceful people adopted a military culture.
  - Kingdoms in the frontiers of India had a military and strategic culture of their own. Each was distinct from the other.

## CONCLUSION

Towards the end, it is brought out that we must now stop looking at—either ‘rising China’ or hoping that it would fail somehow—because China has already risen and if it has not fallen or defaulted in the last 20 years, it is not likely to happen now or anytime soon. The purported peaceful rise of China stands in stark contrast to the endless status quo revisionism in almost all its existing territorial disputes, in its efforts to become the ‘middle kingdom’ geographically, economically and politically. It is argued by experts that the future of Asia will be shaped by the collective social amnesia towards China’s expansionism, in lieu of gaining its economic advantages, which would finally lead to the fast-approaching era of China-centric Asia. Therefore, it is pertinent that India learn its lessons and must increase its engagements with China in the larger national interest and try to balance its regional as well as global influence in the future.

## PROGRAMME

0930–1000h	<b>Tea &amp; Registration</b>
1000–1005h	Welcome Remarks by Lt Gen BS Nagal, Param Vishisht Seva Medal (PVSM), Ati Vishisht Seva Medal (AVSM), Sena Medal (SM) (Retd), Director Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS)
1005–1010h	Opening Remarks by–Dr Amit Gupta
1010–1150h	<b>Session I: The Rise of China and Implications</b>
1010–1020h	Opening Remarks by Chair: Lt Gen Gurmit Singh, PVSM, Uttam Yudh Seva Medal (UYSM), AVSM, Uttam Yudh Seva Medal (VSM) (Retired), Distinguished Fellow, CLAWS
1020–1040h	US-China Strategic Competition and the Implications by Dr Amit Gupta
1040–1100h	Modernisation of the PLA & PLAAF Doctrine, Technological Innovations and Organisational Change by Xiaoming Zhang
1100–1120h	Indian Perspective on China by Dr Monika Chansoria
1120–1150h	Question and Answer
1150–1210h	Tea Break
1210–1330h	<b>Session II : Future of Warfare</b>
1210–1220h	Opening Remarks by Chair: Lt Gen AK Singh, PVSM, AVSM, SM, VSM (Retired), Distinguished Fellow, CLAWS
1220–1240h	The Future of Naval Power by Lee Alan Donaldson
1240 - 1300h	The Future of Land Warfare : An Indian Perspective by Lt Gen Rakesh Sharma, PVSM, UYSM, AVSM, VSM, Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) (Retired), Distinguished Fellow, CLAWS
1300–1330h	Question and Answer
1330–1430h	Lunch
1430–1610h	<b>Session III: Promoting a Culture of Military Diplomacy and Strategic Studies</b>
1430–1440h	Opening Remarks by Chair: Prof Gautam Sen, Distinguished Visiting Fellow, CLAWS

1440–1500h	US Foreign Policy by Dr Amit Gupta
1500–1520h	Developing a Curriculum for a National Defence University by Brian Edward MC Neil
1520–1540h	Culture of Military Diplomacy & Strategy Studies in India by Maj Gen BK Jain, VSM (Retired), Senior Fellow (Veteran)
1540–1610h	Question and Answer
1610–1620h	Closing Remarks by Air War College Team & Lt Gen BS Nagal, PVSM, AVSM, SM (Retired), Director CLAWS
1620h	Tea & Dispersal