

Seminar Report

**INTERNAL DYNAMICS
OF PAKISTAN**

June 09, 2018



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Seminar Co-ordinators : Harsh Kumar Upadhayay and Kanchana Ramanujam
Rapporteur : Kanchana Ramanujam



Centre for Land Warfare Studies

RPSO Complex, Parade Road, Delhi Cantt, New Delhi 110010

Phone: +91.11.25691308 Fax: +91.11.25692347

email: landwarfare@gmail.com • website: www.claws.in

CLAWS Army No. 33098

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4676/21, First Floor, Ansari Road, Daryaganj, New Delhi 110002

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

- Both the enduring weaknesses as well as the enduring strengths of Pakistan need to be understood.
- Pakistan became an Islamic Republic in 1956, but radicalisation has roots in the Pre-Partition era. It made further inroads during Gen Ayub Khan's era, getting further consolidated under Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. It was institutionalised by Gen Zia-ul-Haq.
- Owing to the Russian invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, there was a clandestine international network to promote radicalisation.
- For a long time, Pakistan's foreign policy objectives have been five areas—India, China, United States, Afghanistan and nuclear weapons.
- The 2018 general election is the fourth general election in Pakistan in this century after the ones held in 2002, 2008 and 2013. In the time period from 1988 to 1997, there were four general elections. Hence, it is clear that there certainly is a greater extent of continuity in government in the last decade.
- The greater continuity notwithstanding, there have also been disruptions in the tenure of the PM following the 2008 election and in the current term of the government elected in 2013, which can be attributed to non-political factors.
- The Pashtun awakening, the Baloch uprising and the Gilgit-Baltistan (GB) protests are not new events. They have been years in the making.
- The Barelvi assertion by Tehreek-e-Labbaik Ya Rasool Allah (TLYRA), the peasant revolt in Okara (which has been happening for over 15 years), huge protests in Sindh over the issue of missing persons, as also the manifestation of Sindhi nationalism in the form of Sindhudesh Liberation Army, and so forth, are other noteworthy issues.

- These are popular and genuine rebellions, not manufactured movements like the ‘Pakistan Zindabad’ rallies. Also, they are not separatist, secessionist, anti-State or violent movements, at least not yet.
- 51 agreements have been made under the aegis of China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). The documents of the projects are either not public or, from a lawyer’s perspective, not very transparent.
- The agreements are not registered with the United Nations (UN) under Article 102 of the UN Charter and disputes, if any, should be resolved through ‘friendly consultations.’
- Thousands of acres of agricultural land have been leased to Chinese firms to cultivate seeds, develop hybrids, fertilisers and irrigation methods, for processing, packaging and transporting fruits, vegetables, and other agricultural products. It is amply clear that these interventions in the agricultural sector will not benefit Pakistan, but only China. The upgraded, all-weather highway could easily transport the food products to Western China which is not very fertile.
- More than one-third of the total allocation for CPEC is earmarked for power projects. Estimates vary between US\$27 billion to US\$33 billion. It is not clear who will fix the tariffs for the electricity which is produced. It is believed that China has covered itself contractually against losses with sovereign guarantees from Pakistan. Whether Western China competes to buy the power so produced remains to be seen.
- The Pakistan Army believes that it holds the country together. The Air Force and the Navy are just technical services and do not matter much.
- The Pakistan Army has very strong economic interests to guard and political influence allows it to do so.
- The ideology of Pakistan is based on Islam and anti-Indianism.
- The Pakistan Army uses the anti-India sentiment to continue to dominate the national security narrative so that it remains an

important player in Pakistan and, hence, in a position to guard its economic agenda.

- Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) runs the largest chain of schools in Pakistan—the al Dawa schools.
- One cannot engage with Pakistan without engaging with the military.

DETAILED REPORT

The aspects enumerated as part of this report are based on the deliberations by panellists. These do not necessarily conform to the views of the Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS) or that of the Indian Army or the Ministry of Defence, Government of India.

A national seminar on ‘Internal Dynamics of Pakistan’ was conducted on June 09, 2018, at the Manekshaw Centre, Delhi Cantonment.

Aim

The seminar was aimed at:

- examining societal challenges that Pakistan may face in the coming years,
- deliberating on the outcome of national elections in Pakistan,
- discussing the trajectory of civil–military relations in Pakistan in the coming decade,
- analysing the internal strife in Pakistan and repercussions on its security,
- examining if CPEC would boost the Pakistani economy or if it would be an albatross around its neck, and
- evaluating the potential for change in the political discourse in Pakistan.

Modalities of Conduct

The 1-day seminar was conducted at Ashoka Hall, Manekshaw Centre, Delhi Cantonment on June 09, 2018. The participants were from the armed forces, the strategic community, veterans, academia, students and media. Nominated army officers from field formations also participated in the seminar.

Chair

Mr Amber Sen, Visiting Fellow (CLAWS), formerly Special Secretary (Research and Analysis Wing) and Strategic Intelligence Advisor (National Security Council)

Speakers

- Dr Ajai Sahni, Founding Member and Executive Director, Institute for Conflict Management
- Amb TCA Raghavan, former Indian High Commissioner to Pakistan
- Amb Vivek Katju, Former Secretary (West), Ministry of External Affairs, GoI
- Mr Sushant Sareen, Senior Fellow, Observer Research Foundation
- Prof David Devadas, Author, Journalist and Geopolitical Analyst
- Mr Maroof Raza, Consultant cum Strategic Affairs Expert, Times Now

Inaugural Session

The Director (CLAWS) set the tone for the deliberations to follow by quoting Sun Tzu and emphasising that it was important to understand the country's internal dynamics and implications on external policies. The Pakistan Army has controlled the nation since its birth, at times in the façade of democracy. It has grabbed every opportunity to remain relevant to international relations—be it Central Treaty Organization, Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, the Soviet-Afghan War, or the Global War on Terrorism. While doing so, it did not focus much on economics and welfare of the State—something which seems to be changing now. India needs to understand the fault lines within Pakistan and try and remain ahead of it in the Observe, Orient, Decide and Act loop. In the opening remarks, the Chair highlighted the events that had taken place in Pakistan over the past one year. He mentioned how some commentators felt that the Deep State in Pakistan has had a hand in the removal of the democratically elected Prime Minister—Nawaz

Sharif. He also underscored the general opinion that the Pakistan Army is supporting Imran Khan for the prime ministerial post. A mention was also made of how the current Chief of Staff of the Pakistan Army, Gen Qamar Javed Bajwa, seems to be in favour of talks with India. Talking about the recent popular uprisings in Pakistan, a specific remark was made about the GB Order 2018 passed on May 21. It is a move towards integrating GB, a part of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) under Pakistani occupation, into Pakistan as its fifth province. Successive Indian governments have not paid much attention to GB—a place where the locals have expressed their desire to vote in the J&K elections.

Theme 1: Radicalisation of Pakistan Society, Faultlines and Internal Factionalism

The following faultlines within Pakistan were discussed:

- Terrorism
- Ethno-Nationalism
- Islamisation/Talibanisation
- Sectarianism
- Ethnic divides
- Fragile political scenario
- Economic crisis
- Developmental faults
- Demographic fissures
- Sub-standard education system
- Suspension or arbitrary application of the rule of law
- Weakening or collapse of governance
- Disruptive interventions of the army and non-state actors

Tracing the roots of radicalisation in Pakistan to the Pre-Partition era, the speaker elaborated on how it made further inroads during Gen Ayub Khan's era, got consolidated under Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, and institutionalised under Zia-ul-Haq. In 1979, owing to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, there was a clandestine international network to promote radicalisation. The Islamic revolution in Iran in the very same year, fed Sunni radicalisation. The sectarian divide in Pakistan manifests itself in Ahmadiyyas being declared non-Muslims and the hatred for Shias. There are fractures within the Sunni majority with the Deobandi and the Ahl-e-Hadith groups forming a loose alliance against the Barelvis. Pakistani terrorist groups continuously target places of worship of other sects and minorities. The non-Muslim population in Pakistan has gone down from 23 percent during independence to 3.6 percent in 2017. Pakistanis 132nd out of 136 countries on the 'threat of terrorism costs to businesses' list. There is significant conflict among the ethnic populations of Baloch, Mujahir, Pashtun, Punjabi, Saraikis and Sindhis. There are also disputes in the provinces of Balochistan, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP), Punjab, Sindh and Pakistan-occupied Kashmir. To add to these, there are frequent Islamist terrorist attacks across Pakistan. The enduring strength of Pakistan is that it has been able to contain the situation in KP, albeit through outright repression. The fatalities in the region have come down considerably.

Since partition, there have been a number of major conflicts between Baloch separatists and the Pakistani state forces. There have been extra judicial killings and state-sponsored demographic engineering. Sindhis demand a separate state—Sindhudesh—either autonomous within Pakistan or independent. Saraikistan or Saraiki Movement calls for a separate province and independent state comprising South Punjab. There is a long-term demand for a separate province of Hazara Division of KP.

In Karachi, there has been a factional conflict between Mohajirs and others since independence. Local Sindhi and Pashtun populations feared newcomers would outnumber them, and grab their lands and opportunities. The following demographic change in the population of Karachi has been witnessed—

1941 Census: Sindhis—60 percent, Mohajirs—6 percent, Pashtun—3 percent

1951 Census: Mohajirs—51 percent, Sindhis—14 percent, Pashtun—3 percent

1998 Census: Mohajir—48.52 percent, Punjabi—13.94 percent, Pashtun—11.42 percent, Sindhi—7.62 percent

With a literacy rate of 55 percent, Pakistan is ranked sixth among the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) countries. About 44 percent of all children were outside educational institutions and 43 percent of government schools were in ‘dangerous or dilapidated condition’ lacking basic amenities such as furniture, bathrooms, boundary walls, electricity, and so forth.

Eighty percent of Pakistani population does not have access to safe drinking water. There are chronic deficits in housing, sanitation and transportation. The macroeconomic situation is worrisome—there is an expansion of external and fiscal imbalances, the decline in foreign exchange reserves, and increased risks to Pakistan’s economic and financial outlook and medium-term debt sustainability. According to the World Bank, Pakistan showed a 5.3 percent gross domestic product (GDP) growth with a slow industrial sector. Essentially, Pakistan has a lowered economic capacity, reduced prospect of growth, lack of investment in manufacturing and weakening competitiveness.

With a 2 percent per annum rate of population growth, the conflicts in development variable will get exacerbated. The median age is 22.7 years. With unemployment and poverty, this population could develop a proclivity for violence.

The urban population is 39.7 percent. Urban concentrations are areas of increasing chaos.

The dependence on rural sector persists with agriculture being the largest sector of the economy consisting of half of the employed labour

force. It contributes 24 percent of the GDP and is the largest source of foreign exchange earnings.

Pakistan is already the third most water-stressed country globally. A 2016 report of Pakistan Council of Research in Water Resources (PCRWR) predicts a comprehensive water crisis by 2025. According to the UN Humanitarian Coordinator (Pakistan), Neil Buhne, “No person in Pakistan, whether from the north with its more than 5,000 glaciers, or from the south with its ‘hyper deserts’, will be immune to this.”

To add to all this, population pressures, environmental degradation, poverty and resource deficits continue to rise.

Theme 2: National Assembly Elections in Pakistan: Prognosis of Development on the Political Landscape and Role of the Army

The speaker elaborated on the two narratives that exist about Pakistan:

- The first one is almost structural in nature which defines the State of Pakistan today with respect to its ideological emergence, the overlap of the role of the military with the country’s Islamic underpinnings and how that process got strengthened with international and regional developments in 1979, 1989 and so forth. It leads one to believe that there is a deep state which controls the internal and external dynamics of Pakistan.
- The other narrative posits social and political changes in Pakistan as being much more contingent processes with no particular predisposition towards a certain path of development. These changes are influenced by numerous factors.

The 2018 general election is the fourth general election in Pakistan in this century after the ones held in 2002, 2008, and 2013. From 1988 to 1997, there were four general elections in Pakistan. Hence, there certainly is a greater extent of continuity in the government in the last decade. That said, there have also been disruptions in the tenure of the Prime Ministers following the 2008 and 2013 elections, attributable to nonpolitical factors. Because of the increased continuity in government,

there appears to be a relative strengthening of some institutions like the Election Commission (EC), the judiciary, the media, and so forth. Another viewpoint is that the Pakistan Army is not able to call the shots as it did a decade earlier as it has to rely on these countervailing institutions to keep a check on the political parties. The Pakistan Army was forced to rely more on the religious parties in 2002/03 to counter the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) and Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz) [PML(N)]. To this end, the Inter-Services Intelligence and Gen Pervez Musharraf stitched up the Muttahida Majlis-i-Amal (MMA) as an alliance. Hence, the position that the religious parties attained in 2002/03, they have not been able to achieve again.

Movements such as the Pashtun Tahafuz Movement (PTM) or the developments in Karachi, Balochistan, Sind, and so forth, do not have much of an impact on the overall politics of Pakistan as Punjab is the determinant of the architecture of the government in Islamabad. Punjab has 183 national assembly seats, whereas Sind has 75, KP has 43, Balochistan has 19, Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) has 12, and Islamabad has 3.

Political change in Pakistan is a highly contingent process and the following factors would influence the forthcoming elections:

The ‘Nawaz Sharif versus Pakistan Military’ narrative

This is the predominant narrative which has shaped the dynamics of the forthcoming elections in Pakistan. The 2013 tenure of Nawaz Sharif was marked by one principal characteristic—constant friction with the military. Nawaz Sharif’s posture of defiance is something new for the Pakistani political class. His party is not cracking up, but consolidating behind him. The final outcome of this turbulent civil-military interface was his ouster. There was a concert between the military and the judiciary in ousting Nawaz Sharif.

The ‘Pakistan Army versus civilian political parties’ narrative

The elections will also be contested on the narrative of the role of the military and the high regard in which it is held versus the civilian

political parties propounding the ideals of greater accountability, democracy and so forth.

Changed perception of Pakistan Army post 2015

From 2006 to 2015, there were frequent major terrorist attacks in Pakistan which not only brought down the public morale as far as internal security was concerned but also lowered the esteem in which the Pakistan military was held by the people. Post 2015, the overall improvement in the security situation due to the counter-offensive by the Pakistan Army restored the esteem and regard that it was held in by the public. It is this changed perception of the Army which enabled it to oust Nawaz Sharif—a leader who not only had the full support of his party but also a clear majority in the national assembly.

Pakistan Army's sense of entitlement

There is a feeling in the Pakistan Army that they have earned the right to bring about certain changes because of the experience they underwent battling terrorists. That right is something which a vast number of Pakistani people are prepared to concede to them implicitly or explicitly. This factor would also play a role in the forthcoming elections.

Pakistan Army's interference in Punjab

Whether Nawaz Sharif is able to swing the balance in his favour in Punjab despite Pakistan Army's interventions there through Imran Khan and a combination of other parties remains to be seen. Punjab is crucial to victory in Pakistani elections.

Judicial outcome and impact on Sharif's credibility

The outcome of the case against Nawaz Sharif is awaited. It remains to be seen whether he is sent to jail and how that would impact his credibility.

India should be much more conscious of the contingent developments and contingent forces at work in Pakistan whilst bearing

in mind that the political class in Pakistan is not strong enough to disregard the military or function as in a normal democracy. India should look for options apart from international isolation as there are limits to the pressure that can be put on Pakistan. These limits are even more clearly defined when it comes to the international community. India cannot combine her efforts with the international community's and expect them to be successful beyond a particular point.

Theme 3: The Civil–Mil Relations and Implications on National Discourse

The speaker began by asserting that there are both contingent factors and a structural basis to Pakistan. Therefore, overlooking the structural basis would be a grave mistake. The bureaucracy's ability to keep the political masters in check is limited. The Air Force and the Navy are just technical services and do not matter much. The Pakistan Army believes that it holds the country together. This belief of the Army is constantly promoted by the Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR) by way of projection of the Army as a patriotic/selfless institution and painting a larger-than-life picture of the army chief. A new theme being promoted by the ISPR is that one can be critical of the Pakistan Army, but not of Pakistan.

The following are the salient features of the Pakistan Army:

A professional as well as a political army

The Pakistan Army is not only the ultimate defender of Pakistan's territory but also the defender of the ideology of Pakistan. The ideology of Pakistan is based on Islam and anti-Indianism. Husain Haqqani explains in his book that this means not just antagonism to India, but permanent enmity with India.

Custodian of Muslims

The Pakistan Army sees itself as the guardian of all the Muslims in the Indian sub-continent.

The obligation to intervene in all matters of ‘national interest’

The Pakistan Army does not see itself bound by the Constitution. When it comes to the interests of Pakistan as it defines them, the Army feels it has an obligation to intervene. It does not hesitate to advise the civilian authority whenever it feels that the interests of Pakistan, including law and order situations, are at stake. An example would be the deal struck after the November 2017 sit-in by Tehreek-e-Labbaik over the Khatm-e-Nabuwat (the finality of the prophethood) issue. It had the signatures of the Interior Minister, the Interior Secretary, and a Major General of the Pakistan Army as the guarantor of the agreement. The Army has the authority to advise the civilian bureaucracy and the political class accepts it. During the June 4, 2018 press conference, the Director General ISPR made a mention of how Gen Qamar Javed Bajwa called up the authorities in Lahore and ‘strictly directed’ them to not use force against any PTM protestor. On issues of security, defence policy, foreign policy and nuclear assets, it is not the civilian government, but the Army that would prevail.

Huge business interests

The Pakistan Army has multiple business interests: Fauji Foundation (among the largest business conglomerates in Pakistan), Askari Bank Ltd (acquired by Fauji Foundation), airlines, logistics companies, farms, cement factories, and so forth. Since no one questions all this, it is easy to infer where the balance of power lies.

Since the Army does not contest elections, the Pakistani voter does not see the Army and Nawaz Sharif as a binary. The vote for Nawaz Sharif is not a vote against the Army. The Army’s position is secure in this dynamic and will not change after the elections. The Army, with a compliant judiciary, has made it abundantly clear that Nawaz Sharif will be locked up. The Pakistan judiciary has largely been hand-in-glove with the Army, but there have been periods when it has asserted itself. The Lawyers’ Movement after the suspension of Iftikhar Chaudhry gave a tough time to

Gen Musharraf. The judiciary has taken a strong view on the missing persons' case. All this notwithstanding, the judiciary's acceptance of the military courts is indicative of the fact that at the end of the day, the judiciary does not want to confront the Army and is ready to take a backseat.

Owing to the fear of a nuclear war, the international community is only interested in peace between India and Pakistan, even if it is at the cost of India.

Theme 4: Internal Protests and Rising Rebellions within Pakistan: Case of GB, Balochistan and Pashtuns

The speaker clarified that the Pashtun awakening, the Baloch uprising, and the GB protests are not new events. They have been years in the making. Apart from these three, there has been the Bareilly assertion by TLYRA, peasant revolt in Okara (which has been happening for over 15 years), huge protests in Sindh over the issue of missing persons, as also a manifestation of Sindhi nationalism in the form of Sindhudesh Liberation Army, and so forth. The trajectory that these protests follow is never linear because they face pushback from the State, the Deep State, the non-State, the de jure State, the quasi-State, and all other variations of the State. Hence, these movements mutate and re-emerge even if they are crushed. A case in point is that of the PTM. What was purely a tribal movement of the Mehsud tribesmen way back in 2013 mutated into a much more broad-based PTM.

The following are the key features of these rebellions:

- These are popular and genuine rebellions, unlike the 'Pakistan Zindabad' rallies being manufactured by the Pakistan Army. The former movements represent the sentiments of the people they claim to speak for.
- These rebellions show the changing nature of how political mobilisation is taking place at the grass-root level. Both the PTM and the GB protests are rights-driven. They are demanding rights which are or should be guaranteed to them under

the constitution. They are not separatist, secessionist, anti-State or violent movements, at least not yet.

- The GB movement is 10–15 years old and has been, in a large measure, for greater integration into Pakistan. What people in GB want is no taxation without representation. The demands of PTM activists are also not extra-constitutional as the Constitution lays down certain limits against the use of force for the security forces. The Baloch movement is of course, completely different.
- In almost all the cases, there is a solid background to the events, things have been on the boil for years, and one incident acted like a catalyst for sparking off the movement, much like the Arab Spring. In the case of PTM, from 2012, over 2000–3000 people have been killed in Karachi alone, a bulk of them being Pashtun. No cognizance of even one case was taken by the ‘independent’ judiciary until the encounter of Naqibullah Mehsud. The Pashtuns have been facing racial profiling and humiliation for long and even senior, retired government officers have been mistreated when they wanted to return to their native places in the tribal belt. The Barelvi assertion has been decades in the making because of the aggressiveness of the Deobandis and the Wahhabis and reached its zenith with the hanging of Mumtaz Qadri. In the case of the GB protests, it was the imposition of taxes. The fifth version of the Baloch protests started in 2000/01 and assumed menacing proportions after the assassination of Akbar Bugti in 2006. In the case of the peasant revolt in Okara, it was the high-handedness of the army farmers.
- The mobilisation of people is such that it cuts across tribal, clan, ethnic, sectarian, and religious lines. The primary reason for this is that the protests are led by young, educated people from the middle class. In Quetta, Manzoor Pashteen expresses solidarity with both the Baloch (there is discord between the Pashtuns and Balochs in Balochistan) and the Hazaras (Pashtuns are predominantly Sunnis and almost all Hazaras are Shias) and does not fear about his supportbase getting eroded. The Okara agitators have made common cause with the primarily Pashtun-driven rallies of PTM. The Baloch Liberation Front has cut through tribal hierarchies and

tribal dividing lines. The case of Tehreek-e-Labaik can be likened to that of the High Church against the Low Church or the Pir against the Murid.

- Use of modern means of communication to connect with the people and build the narrative. As in the case of the Arab Spring, in these movements too, social media has become an extremely potent tool as the Deep State has imposed a virtual blanket ban on any coverage of the protestors. Moreover, the Deep State uses them in mainstream media as well as the social media for propaganda against the protestors by portraying them as paid agents who work for foreign interests as part of the latter's hybrid war strategy.
- The leadership is politically savvy, articulate, quick to learn from mistakes, and very sound in the logic they present for their arguments. They have a remarkable emotional connect with the people, and appear fearless of the heavy-handed tactics of the State and the Deep State which is used to crush dissent. The vacuum in leadership created as a result of the Taliban having wiped off tribal elders as also the exodus of people due to the scorched earth policy of the Pakistan Army has been filled by the millennials. The PTM protestors swear by non-violence, while the Baloch youth seem to have given up on the legal means to acquire their objective.
- The role of women activists is remarkable, especially in the cases of PTM and the Baloch activists. Women are in the front-line and active on social media in these very traditional and conservative societies. Moreover, there is no sexual harassment.
- These are apolitical movements. The politicians are in fact, trying to capitalise on the PTM. The dilemma for these politicians is that supporting the PTM would antagonise the Deep State which will affect their electoral prospects while opposing the PTM could cost them the support of their core voters. Though the PTM has revived Pashtun nationalism, the Awami National Party—a Pashtun nationalist party—has tried to distance itself from it. Its cadres, however, remain attached to the PTM. Pakhtunkhwa Milli Awami Party, another Pashtun nationalist party, has openly supported the PTM on certain occasions.

Pakistan takes the PTM seriously as, unlike the Sindhis and the Balochs, the Pashtuns are very well represented in the Army and are part of the ruling clique along with the Punjabis, even if as junior partners. Even the Pashteen cap has become a national security concern for the Army! The Army is trying to sow seeds of division within the ranks of PTM as they have done successfully in the cases of the Sindhis, Balochs, and the Okara movement. The Pakistan Army uses the 'good Taliban' to browbeat the leaders of PTM as in the case of a senior leader of PTM whose shop and petrol pump were attacked by the 'good' Taliban in Mir Ali. With these movements, such forces have been unleashed which are difficult to be put back in a bottle and even if it is done, these forces will return in a much more virulent form.

Theme 5: Chinese Investment, Emerging Issues in CPEC and the State of the Pakistan Economy

Physical Structure of CPEC

The speaker described how the CPEC infrastructure forms a physical grid across Pakistan. The main route of CPEC is to pass through Sindh and Punjab. The railway and main highway from Gwadar will run close to the coast to the outskirts of Karachi and then join the main CPEC road from Karachi to the north. One loop this route is to pass very close to the Indian border. There are two more arterial routes along the Indus and the third through Balochistan and KP. This grid will not only be built but also owned, operated, and controlled, to a large extent, by Chinese companies and whichever agencies they choose to employ.

Dubious documentation

Fifty- one agreements have been made under the aegis of CPEC, but they do not provide for strong dispute-resolution mechanisms. The documents of the projects are either not very transparent or not available to the public. The speaker mentioned that the May 2013 memorandum of understanding (MoU) on which the CPEC project has been founded did not have the hallmark of legal drafting and language. The agreements are not registered with the UN under Article 102 of the

UN Charter and disputes, if any, should be resolved through ‘friendly consultations’.

The extent of Chinese control

China’s parliament had specially passed a concessionary loan of US\$4.2 billion for the 392 km Multan-Sukkur section of the Lahore–Karachi motorway, but the modalities of the repayment of the loan and the operation of the motorway are unclear. US\$8.5 million is to be spent to upgrade and build fresh sections of Pakistan’s railways, but the extent of Chinese control over it is not clear. The scale of Chinese control over Pakistan through the military and communication installations that CPEC will bring into Pakistan remains unclear. The most obvious example of overt control is Gwadar. Gwadar is to have an airport which can take heavy aircraft and an industrial park in which Chinese companies have been invited to operate. The original CPEC plan had envisioned 29 industrial parks and 21 special economic zones in which Chinese companies are to operate. Chinese security personnel at Gwadar and along the infrastructure that is to be constructed are only one aspect of control. Control over telecommunication is even more crucial. There is a plan to lay an 820-km-long optic fibre network from Khunjerab Pass to Rawalpindi which will not only provide the country’s internet connectivity but also its TV feed. An MoU was signed to this effect in July 2013, in which it was specifically envisioned as a ‘cultural transmission carrier’. The CPEC plan also includes installation of ‘safe city’ with surveillance from Peshawar to Karachi and round-the-clock recording of public places.

Feeding Western China through CPEC

Thousands of acres of agricultural land has been leased to Chinese firms to cultivate seeds, develop hybrids, fertilisers and irrigation methods, for processing, packaging, and transporting fruits, vegetables, and other agricultural products. Apart from the Southeast Asian region, the Gangetic Plain and Eastern China, the most fertile area in Asia is Punjab. It is far more fertile than Western China. The upgraded, all-weather highway could easily transport the food products to Western China. It is amply clear that these interventions

in Pakistan's agricultural sector will not benefit Pakistan but only China. Energy production is an important part of the CPEC plan. More than 1/3rd of the total allocation for CPEC is earmarked for power projects. Estimates vary between US\$27 billion to US\$33 billion. It is not clear who will fix the tariffs for the electricity which is produced. It is believed that China has covered itself contractually against losses with sovereign guarantees from Pakistan as the Pakistani government tends to fix low power tariffs that result in a loss for Pakistani power companies. Whether Western China competes to buy the power so produced, remains to be seen. The Diamer–Bhasha Dam is being constructed by 17,000 Chinese workers. China could have some plans for the water stored in it given that Xinjiang is a dry area. The two hydroelectric power generation schemes that are part of CPEC will dam the Indus River at the edge of the GB region. The capacity of even the smaller of those dams is greater than that of Gobind Sagar Bhakra–Nangal. The combined reservoir capacity of those two dams is 24 km³ compared with Bhakra's 9 km.³

A noteworthy point is that many countries that are running high debts with China have a strategic value. Among the countries that have been identified as most unlikely to be able to pay their debt to China are Iraq, Syria, Yemen, Ethiopia and Ukraine. China is taking up heavily debt-laden projects in all the CARs, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. China's projects in South East and Central Asia are in countries that are geographically contiguous with it. Geopolitically, China–Russia–Iran may cooperate to repel the US–Saudi–Israel group, but how will the former trio engage in the New Great Games in the CARs remains to be seen.

Theme 6: Role of the Military in Pakistan Politics

Military's interventions

It can be seen that the military's intervention in politics has been due to the inability of the politicians to (i) take interest in national security issues, and (ii) actually work towards a stable political environment. The first intervention was in 1958 when Pakistan had six PMs over a span of 7 years from 1951 to 1958. In the history of Pakistan, every

military commander who intervened in politics was chosen to be the commander-in-chief because he was seen to be politically safe. Ayub Khan was chosen to stamp down on what came to be known as the Rawalpindi Conspiracy as he was seen as politically safe. Whenever the military has intervened, people have welcomed the coup as politicians had taken Pakistan into a state of dysfunctionality.

Islamisation

Though Zia-ul-Haq is seen as the man responsible for Islamisation, it started from the time of Ayub Khan. Ayub Khan believed that Islam was the factor that would bind Pakistan together and started engaging with Islamic preachers. He also wrote a document, circulated to Pakistani Army officers confidentially in 1959, on how Islam would be an important factor in Pakistan's evolution as a State. Zia, unlike Ayub Khan, started using Islam in a stage-by-stage process and simultaneously continued to engage the United States to Pakistan's advantage. This gave Pakistan the necessary resources to contest India.

Use of irregular warfare

Ayub Khan had a research wing which highlighted the tradition of the use of irregular warfare in Islamic history. Ayub Khan believed that it was something that Pakistan must perfect, to use it to its advantage against India. Hence, we see the examples of Op Gibraltar and Op Grand Slam. Pakistan formally adopted jihad as a way of warfare in Zia's time with Op Topac. Zia defined how Islam and jihadists would play an important role in Op Topac and identified three areas of focus for Pakistan:

- Create a pro-Pakistani sentiment in the Valley by using youth and 'mullahs', which would eventually lead to the establishment of an Islamic State.
- Engage the Indian Army extensively along the Line of Control and other areas to divert their attention from the Valley.
- When the above two are happening to Pakistan's advantage, go in and create an Islamic State. The spread of Wahhabism in the Valley would only ease the process.

Pakistan Army's Economic Interests

The speaker asserted that the Pakistan Army has very strong economic interests to guard. Political influence allows it to have a strong economic agenda, and that is not limited to just getting a large chunk of Pakistan's budget allocated to the military. Gen Musharraf, for example, had placed serving and retired officers in virtually every undertaking in Pakistan. The Army has quietly and steadily encroached upon various business fields. The Fauji Foundation was a creation of the funds that were allocated to the soldiers at the end of World War II. Unlike India, Pakistan kept the corpus together and today, the Fauji Foundation, along with the Army Welfare Trust, has diversified into various fields such as transportation, fertilisers, housing projects, and so forth. The Fauji Foundation generates US\$20 billion annually, which is double the amount Pakistan declares as its defence budget (US\$9 billion). Hussain Haqqani states in his book that 72 percent of Pakistan's spending goes towards furthering the military's agenda, and it is not necessarily buying weapons. He further states that Pakistan inherited a military which was 1/3rd of the size of the British Army in India. It also inherited resources which were not in excess of 17 percent of the entire resources that made up British India. Hence, the military had to create a role for itself to garner enough resources to service its larger-than-life role as the saviour of the Pakistani State.

Anti-Indianism

The best bonding adhesive in Pakistan remains anti-Indianism. The fear and hate for India have been etched deep in the Pakistani psyche through textbooks, manipulation of literature, rewriting of history, and so forth. Minds are influenced from a very young age: Le Truns the largest set of schools in Pakistan—the al Dawa schools. The Pakistan Army uses the anti-India sentiment to continue to dominate the national security narrative so that it remains an important player in Pakistan and hence, in a position to guard its economic agenda. If anyone challenges this discourse, they are put out of business like Geo TV. Pakistan's desperation to get Kashmir has limited its ability to define nation-building beyond getting Kashmir. The governments in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK) are held in abeyance by Islamabad

as the latter believes that the former's full role would begin after the Valley's integration with PoK.

The exclusive turfs of the Pakistan Army

For a long time, Pakistan's foreign policy objectives have revolved around five areas—India, China, United States, Afghanistan and nuclear weapons. The Pakistan Army believes that it reserves full right over national security and foreign policy issues. Benazir Bhutto's second swearing-in was delayed until she accepted to keep away from national security issues and focus on child and social welfare.

There is no counter to the military at least in the near future. One cannot engage with Pakistan without engaging with the military—a case in point being the Lahore Declaration. Only those agreements which are made with the Pakistan Army will stand the test of time as has been the case with the Cease-fire Agreement, the Indus Waters Treaty, and the agreement relating to the LoC. For any lasting solution, engagement with the Pakistan Army is perhaps the only solution.

CONCEPT NOTE

General

- Pakistan, since its creation has evolved from a proposed secular nation-state to one propagating Islam as a Central tenet. The nation has seen major changes since General Zia-ul-Haq assumed power, fuelled further by the Afghanistan war followed by the creation of terror sanctuaries and radicalisation of the population based on Wahhabi-Salafism. This radicalisation has created extremism in the society. Many terror groups have been raised by the state for use as proxies in India and Afghanistan, whilst some have emerged against the state itself. The violence and suffering due to their activities is troubling the state and may result in the state suffering in the long run.
- The Cold War helped Pakistan obtain military equipment and membership of Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), thereby building its military capability. This was further bolstered by the Afghanistan Mujahideen War and the Global War on Terror (GWOT).
- The military capabilities and coups over the decades have placed the Pakistan Army in the driver's seat in Pakistani policy making. The civil government does not have the liberty to chart an independent policy.
- The Islamisation drive by General Zia-ul-Haq has shifted the focus of Pakistan society away from a modern secular outlook to an Islam-centric society. The radicalisation and faction-driven society has created violence and mayhem in the country.
- The polity is also now composed of fringe and extreme elements in all groupings. The competitive race to occupy space where fundamentalism prevails is causing upheaval in the political discourse.

- The civil–military relations in Pakistan are one way of the military controlling the policies with the anti-India policy being the central theme. It ensures their survival and centrality in public perception. The political parties too encourage the arrangement when in the opposition.
- Pakistan has witnessed internal strike and demonstrations in the past few decades. Social media and lack of development are causing upheavals in the country when aspirations are not met by the State. Internal rebellion and disturbance will pose their own challenges in the future.
- The past policies of Pakistan have left it impoverished and underdeveloped. China has now stepped into create China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) as a remedy to Pakistan’s economic problems. The hidden agenda of China needs evaluation as do the viability issues of CPEC.
- The cases of Balochistan, Gilgit-Baltistan and the very recent Pashtun protests reflect the rising discontent in the Pakistani society against the Pakistani Army and the State, which is gaining momentum. Implications of these rising tides of protests with regard to CPEC and the state of the Chinese investment in the Pakistani economy need comprehensive assessment. There is an increasing opposition to CPEC within Pakistan due to fears of forcible land-grab. The Balochistan Liberation Front (BLF), an insurgent group fighting for independent Balochistan has carried out several attacks against the Pakistan Army, which has been providing security to CPEC workers. Several issues have cropped up which are a setback to CPEC. The cancellation of Diamer–Basha Dam and the temporary suspension of at least three major road projects in Pakistan, namely the 2010-km-long Dera Ismail Khan–Zhob Road, being built at an estimated cost of Rs 81 billion, the 110-km-long Khuzdar–Basima Road, having an estimated cost of Rs 19.76 billion and 36 km of Karakoram Highway from Raikot to Thakot, worth Rs 8.5 billion, is a reflection of the stumbling blocks cropping up in CPEC. The rising speculations about CPEC regarding its geostrategic implications, analysis of the setbacks, and emerging challenges which CPEC is facing, will not only forecast the state

of the Pakistani economy in days to come but also will revise the speculated implications of CPEC.

Objectives

- The objectives of the seminar are:
 - a. To examine societal challenges that Pakistan may face in the coming years.
 - b. To crystal gaze on the outcome of national elections in Pakistan.
 - c. To discuss the trajectory of civil–military relations in the coming decade.
 - d. To discuss the internal strife in Pakistan and repercussions on Pakistan security.
 - e. To determine if China-led CPEC will turn around the Pakistan economy or will it be an albatross around Pakistan’s neck.
 - f. To evaluate the potential for change in the political discourse in Pakistan.

Programme

The proposed programme and session details are attached separately.

Participants

The participants will be from the armed forces, strategic community, veterans, academia and media.

Venue

Ashoka Hall, Manekshaw Centre, Delhi Cantonment

Seminar Coordinator

The coordinators for the seminar are:

- Mr Harsh Kumar Upadhayay, Research Assistant, CLAWS, email address: hkupadhayaya90@gmail.com
- Ms KanchanaRamanujam, Research Assistant, CLAWS, email address: dodasstudents@gmail.com

PROGRAMME

0900-0930h	Registration and Tea
0930-0935h	Welcome Remarks by Lt Gen BS Nagal, PVSM, AVSM, SM (Retd), Director CLAWS
0935-0945h	Opening Remarks by the Chair – Mr Amber Sen, Visiting Fellow, CLAWS
0945-1010h	Radicalisation of Pakistan Society, Faultlines and Internal Factionalism - Sh Ajai Sahni
1010-1035h	National Assembly Elections in Pakistan :Prognosis of Development on the Political Landscape and Role of the Army- Amb TCA Raghavan
1035-1100h	The Civil-Mil Relations and Implication on National Discourse - Amb Vivek Katju
1100-1130h	Q&A
1130-1200h	Tea
1200-1225h	Internal Protests and Rising Rebellions within Pakistan: Case of Gilgit-Baltistan, Baluchistan and Pashtuns - Sh Sushant Sareen
1225-1250h	Chinese Investment, Emerging issues in CPEC and the State of the Pakistan Economy - Prof David Devadas
1250-1315h	Role of the Military in Pakistan Politics - Maroof Raza
1315-1345h	Q&A
1345-1355h	Closing Remarks by Lt Gen BS Nagal, PVSM, AVSM, SM (Retd), Director CLAWS
1355h	Lunch & Dispersal